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This report explains the principal economic and legal features of a unique set of data on 
283 modern private international cartels discovered anywhere in the world from January 
1990 to the end of 2005. Measured in real 2005 money, aggregate cartel sales and 
overcharges totaled about $1.2 trillion and $500 billion, respectively. In the early 2000s, 
about 35 such cartels were discovered each year.  We find that global cartels comprise 
more than half of the sample’s affected sales and are larger, longer lasting, and more 
injurious than other types. In the early 2000s world-wide corporate penalties stabilized 
at or above $2 billion per year, one-thousand times penalties in the early 1990s. More 
than 40% of those penalties were from settlements in private suits, and most of the rest 
are fines imposed by U.S. and EU antitrust authorities. 
 
Median penalties are low: from 1.4% to 4.9% of affected sales, depending on the type of 
prosecution. As a proportion of damages, median fines ranged from less than 1% for 
EU-wide cartels to 17.6% for Canada. Private plaintiffs obtained 38% of damages from 
international cartelists.  World wide, median real cartel penalties of all types amounted 
to less than 5% of overcharges. [See Summary next page for more details] 
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This report explains the principal economic and legal features of a unique set of data on 
283 modern private international cartels discovered anywhere in the world from January 
1990 to the end of 2005. Some of the main findings are: 
 
•  Approximately 47% were active only in Europe, 16% in North America, and 12% 
in nations of other continents. The remaining 25% of cartels were global cartels – 
those operating across two or more continents.   
•  For the cartels no longer under investigation, 86% were required to pay monetary 
penalties, 5% had received warnings, and the remaining 6% had seen their 
investigations closed without any known verbal or monetary sanctions. 
•  International-cartel discovery rates have been increasing since 1990, from four to 
six per year in the early 1990s to about 35 per year in 2003-2005. Since 2001 the 
majority of convictions have come from authorities other than the US or EU. 
•  Affected sales real 2005 U.S. dollars are about $2.1 trillion. Global cartels had 
the highest median sales ($2.6 billion), but those active only in Western Europe 
were not far behind. Seventy-nine percent of the sample’s sales originated from 
cartels composed of manufacturers.  
•  The leading cartelized industries are in manufacturing (79% of sales), especially 
chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and electronic devices. Next are services 
(21%), and the least important are raw materials. Most cartelized goods are 
industrial intermediate inputs (62%). 
•  The mean cartel overcharge was $2.1 billion. Median overcharge rates for most 
kinds of cartels were 24% of affected sales, but the median for global types was 
29% of sales. Thus, aggregate damages were near $500 billion.  
•  Monetary sanctions imposed on international cartelists since 1989 have been the 
highest in antitrust history. Total penalties imposed were $25.4 billion in nominal 
terms and $13.5 billion in real 2005 U.S. dollars. Real penalties in the early 
1990s totaled less than $2 million per year, accelerated quickly, and peaked at 
about $2 billion annually in 1998-2000.  
•  Widespread recidivism implies that present cartel sanctions are inadequate to 
deter cartel formation. More than 170 companies were price-fixing recidivists 
during 1990-2005, of which 11 companies fixed prices from 10 to 26 times.  
•  Penalties imposed on global cartels accounted for 56% of all real penalties, of 
which the 18 vitamins cartels were nearly half.  
•  Cartels caught in Europe accounted for 22% of the fines, North American cartels 
for 17% and the rest of the world only about 5%. Private damages suits in North 
America extracted at least 43% of the total penalties on international cartels.  
•  The median real penalty/sales ratio varied from 1.4 to 4.9%, depending on the 
type of prosecution. As a proportion of damages, median fines ranged from less 
than 4% for EU Member States’ cartels to 17.6% for Canada. Private plaintiffs 
obtained 38% of damages from international cartelists.  World wide, median real 
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Since the mid 1990s there has been a resurgence of interest in economic and legal 
studies of cartels, particularly cartels with international dimensions.
1  For the first time in 
decades, a review article was published in the American Economic Association’s 
prestigious  Journal of Economic Literature (Levenstein and Suslow 2006).  A major 
collection of classic articles on cartels is about to be published (Salant and Levenstein 
2007).  
 
In part this renewal of interest represents an outgrowth of progress in game theoretic 
models of collusion and of auctions.  Many recent economic studies are motivated by a 
desire to test the predictive power of new theoretical models. However, the principal 
driver of the post-1995 surge in cartel studies appears to be the increasing prevalence 
of discovered large-scale conspiracies by the antitrust authorities of North America and 
the European Union (EU). It is evident that the numbers of international cartels 
discovered by the antitrust authorities of Canada and the United States increased 
precipitously after 1995 (Connor 2003). Moreover, the government fines imposed on 
companies involved in international price fixing also escalated through about 2000, 
thereafter settling into a pattern of monetary sanctions that was much higher than that 
seen before 1995 (Connor 2004).
2  
 
Despite the renewed interest in international cartels, many authors bemoan the absence 
of appropriate data to engage in rigorous quantitative economic analysis. This is 
particularly true for “modern” cartels (those formed after World War II). While some 
researchers have had access to detailed economic data on a single cartel, the 
sparseness of cross-sectional data on modern cartels is particularly striking. This 




These data can serve as a basis of several kinds of economic analyses of cartels. 
Empirical regularities can be used to identify “stylized facts” that guide the design of 
economic models of cartels.  The economic dimensions of the newest international 
                                                            
1 Connor (2006b) reviews the development of cartel studies from the 1880s to contemporary times. He 
identifies the 1890s, the late 1940s, and the late 1970s as peaks in numbers and quality of empirical 
studies by economists on cartels.  
2 Joshua (2006) points out that the trend toward markedly higher cartel fines in the EU had begun some 
ten years earlier. Although noted by scholars of European antitrust law, it is curious why economists did 
not turn their attention to cartel studies in response to the well documented international cartel decisions 
of the European Commission (EC). Perhaps it was because the number of EC cartel decisions did not 
increase much after the mid 1980s.  Or perhaps it was the way in which the decisions were written: they 
typically focused on the conduct and internal organization of the sanctioned cartels but contained little 
information of the type that would permit economists to measure the effects on market performance or 
consumer welfare.    
3 The data presented in this report are current as of late 2005. Some of the figures on affected sales, 
overcharges, and monetary sanctions will be revised as new information comes to light. Moreover, new 
international cartels continued to be investigated and sanctioned in 2006.  We hope to update this report 
in future years. 3 
cartels can be compared to those active during the interwar period of 1920-1940; such a 
comparison may reveal insights about the influence of broad historical conditions 
(degree of globalization, rigor of anticartel regimes, etc.) on cartel formation or 
effectiveness.  Other quantitative analyses can measure the determinants of cartel 
duration or overcharges.  
 
Considerable effort has been devoted to collecting information on fines, settlements, 
and other cartel sanctions.  These data are valuable simply as a way of charting the 
implementation of new antitrust policies, but are also useful as elements in a variety of 
legal-economic analyses.  For example, one can evaluate the government-imposed and 
private antitrust sanctions relative to the economic harm caused by these cartels.  This 
analysis has important implications for the deterrence power of antitrust sanctions 
(Connor 2006c). Moreover, one can use these data to analyze the pattern of 
cooperation discounts from the fines imposed by the world’s major antitrust agencies, 




This paper identifies and describes the members, markets, monetary sanctions, and 
other economic dimensions of all modern international cartels discovered by antitrust 
authorities since about January 1990. By members, we mean the names of the 
companies or their subsidiaries that were identified by prosecutors as participants in 
illegal price-fixing schemes. The markets are, of course, the products that were the 
objects of price fixing. We have attempted to collect or develop information on the 
“affected commerce” by the cartels; that is, for a large proportion of these markets we 
identify the revenues of the cartels during the collusive period. Monetary sanctions 
include both government fines and the settlements reached in private damages suits in 
North America. Finally, for a large minority of the cartels, we provide and analyze the 





This paper focuses on private international “hard-core” cartels. A cartel is an association 
of legally independent firms that aims to raise their joint profits through explicit 
agreements. Hard-core cartels fashion agreements to control market prices or restrict 
industry supply (or both). We follow as far as possible the definition of international 
price-fixing agreements employed by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ).  That is, the term international describes a cartel’s membership 
composition.
5  Therefore, an international cartel is a conspiracy in restraint of trade that 
                                                            
4 The inclusion of price-fixing overcharges is an outgrowth of the senior author’s research on the topic 
(see Connor 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, and 2007; Connor and Bolotova 2006; and Connor and Lande 
2005). 
5 A large majority of our sample of international cartels also are international in a geographic sense. 
Exceptions are national export cartels that usually have their membership drawn from one nation. Another 
exception is ocean liner conferences. They are categorized as global because their rates affected 
commerce between Europe and one other continent. All cartels fined by the EU qualify as international 
because the European Commission only has jurisdiction if a cartel sells a significant proportion of its 
output (or buys inputs) across the borders of the EU’s member states.  4 
has or is alleged to have one or more corporate or individual participants with 
headquarters, residency, or nationality outside the jurisdiction of the investigating 
antitrust authority.  We have identified most of the cartels as international by using the 
country of registration of the parent companies participating in the cartel.  
    
This paper further categorizes international cartels into three degrees of geographic 
spread, namely, global, EU, and national.  Global international cartels fixed or attempted 
to fix prices on at least two continents.  Most of the “global” cases examined herein 
involve cartels that targeted markets in “the triad” of the most industrialized regions of 
the world – Western Europe, North America, and East Asia.  A large minority of the 
global cartels also conspired to fix prices in Africa, Latin America, Oceania, or other 
parts of Asia. The EU-wide cartels operate across two or more countries, but entirely 
within a single customs union, the European Union (EU).
6  The EU cartels are classified 
separately because while the EU is well along to becoming economically integrated into 
a single market, it is not quite a unified sovereign state with a federal structure. The 
national cartels confined their operations to one country.  
 
Categorizing cartels according to their geographic locus of operation is usually straight 
forward. The corporate members of global cartels subject to U.S., Canadian, or EU 
prosecution usually are identified as such by the press releases or reports of the 
prosecuting authorities. Joint raids or publicly revealed investigations by two or more of 
the major antitrust agencies are further indicators of probable global scope. In a small 
number of cases, the composition of the cartel allows one to infer how widespread the 
cartel operated. However, a few cartel cases required judgment about their geographic 
locus of operation. 
 
The EU-wide cartels are signaled by the involvement of the EC as the prosecuting unit, 
because the EC is usually required to establish significant effects on trade between the 
Member States in order to investigate a potential violation.
7 However, the reverse is not 
true. Member States of the EU typically prosecute only nation-wide cartels with 
negligible cross-border effects, but their competition authorities may prosecute 
international cartels under EU law as well. The 2003 prawns-fishing case in the 
Netherlands is the first example of this type. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Focusing exclusively on international cartels is justified on several counts. Foremost is the fact 
that international cartels present prosecutors with distinctly greater challenges than purely domestic 
conspiracies.  The difficulties of obtaining evidence and testimony from sources located abroad are well 
documented by failed prosecutions in the early 1990s; lack of cooperation from foreign governments and 
courts added to these difficulties. Another justification is the notably greater publicity given international 
cases by journalists and the antitrust authorities themselves; this ensures that information more likely to 
be complete for international cartels than for modest domestic actions. Finally, the economic harm 
caused by international collusion tends to be greater than localized conspiracies.
  
 
6 The EC has antitrust jurisdiction not only the EU proper but also a group of states that are members of 
the European Free Trade Agreement (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and, before they joined the EU, 
Finland, Sweden, and Austria).  This expanded antitrust zone is called the European Economic Area. 
7 The vitamin B4 cartels are a case in point.  Three North American manufacturers agreed to cease 
exporting to Europe, and three European companies reciprocated.  All six met once, but thereafter 
operated separately as far as is known.  We treat them as two conspiracies, one centered in the NAFTA 
area and one EU-wide.  
 5 
 
The national category contains the smallest cartels in a geographic sense, those few 
that had international representation but that operated solely or almost solely within a 
single national border or a single customs union.
8  A cartel prosecuted by one national 
authority may have been active more broadly, but a second antitrust authority may not 
have prosecuted because of lack of evidence or limited prosecutorial resources. In a 
few cases, multiple national prosecutions are entered as separate observations even 
though one might speculate that they were connected conspiracies.
9  Although a rather 
awkward phrasing, these cartels may be thought of as “domestic” international cartels.  
  
Global cartels are a special kind of international cartel, one that fixed prices in at least 
two continents. Most global cartels attempted the control of prices in all three of the 
world’s major industrialized regions: East Asia, North America, and Western Europe; all 
other areas open to international trade were usually affected. In a few cases, global 





This paper samples international cartels that have been “discovered” because they 
were sanctioned or are likely to be sanctioned for a price fixing violation from January 
1990 through December 2005.  By sanctioned is meant pleaded guilty, were judged 
guilty by a court of law or a commission, were indicted and are awaiting trial, were fined 
by an antitrust authority, or agreed to pay a civil settlement.
11  Cartels known to be 
under investigation by a public antitrust authority between January 1990 and March 
2006 are sampled. Most were sanctioned by March 2006, but a small proportion are 
either still under investigation or had their investigations closed before an indictment or 
a Statement of Objections was issued. Usually the reasons for closing an investigation 
are not announced, but often the reason is lack of sufficient evidence or illegal activities 
that were curtailed prior to a statute of limitations.  
 
There are no geographic or industrial limitations on the cartels sampled. However, as 
the world’s most active antitrust authorities are clustered in North America and Europe, 
the sample contains relatively few cartels active only outside these continents. 
Searching for cases was made principally in English-language sources. More than half 
of the world’s antitrust authorities have English-language sections that sometimes give 
detailed accounts of sanctioned cartels.
12  Cartels active in Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, and a few other Anglophone jurisdictions may be over-represented 
because they have assertive English-language presses.
13  
                                                            
8 A few “NAFTA” cartels that operated in both Canada and the United States are placed in this category. 
9 For example, several ready-mix cement bidding rings have been prosecuted in Europe that contained 
overlapping membership and time periods. Some European retail-gasoline and pharmaceutical cartels 
may have been prosecuted after cooperation among some EU member states.  
10 The choline chloride cartel is an example. For a couple of years the six North American and European 
producers had a world-wide scope, but then after agreeing to cease exports into each other’s continents, 
they divided management into two parts that operated with little overlap or communication.  
11 In a few cases cartels are included that experienced initial sanctioning decisions in the 1980s were 
appealed and final decisions not issued until the 1990s. 
12 The OECD gathers competition-law agency reports annually. 
13 On the other hand, many non-English-speaking countries have major newspapers or press services 





We begin this report by explaining how the sample of private international cartels was 
created and providing a brief overview of how the observations are distributed by 
region, industry, and over time. The next section examines the known and projected 
affected sales of the cartels. We next analyze an important measure of modern cartel 
effectiveness, namely, the market price effects.  Estimates of the amount of 
overcharges in at least one geographic region are available for about one-third of the 
sample. Overcharge rates are also calculated.  Finally, we present information on 
recidivism and corporate monetary sanctions by antitrust authorities and courts 
everywhere in the world. This last substantive section is applicable to the current policy 







Information is drawn from many sources. First, most discovered cartels are first 
revealed to the public when fines, a guilty plea, or an indictment is announced in press 
releases of the DOJ, the Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB), EC, or a score of other 
national antitrust authorities with active anticartel programs. The brief press releases 
are followed by additional documents, such as sentencing memorandums, plea 
agreements, detailed published decisions (in the EU especially), “statements of fact” (in 
Canada), annual reports, and speeches of antitrust officials. In Europe the most 
important cartels have the full decisions of the EC (some of them running to more than a 
hundred pages) posted publicly a year or two after the brief press releases about 
Commission decisions. Lesser cases are described in the Competition Directorate’s 
quarterly newsletter. All these documents are preserved on the web sites of the U.S., 
Canadian, and the EU antitrust authorities going back to the mid 1980s in most cases. 
Related U.S., Canadian, and European court decisions are fully archived.  
 
A second source of data occurs when an investigation is announced or leaked to the 
press or when raids on corporate offices are noticed. Then business newspapers, trade 
magazines, and news services begin to publish pieces on the alleged violators and their 
industries. Older articles are often available that describe the size, growth, and market 
structures of the affected markets. Once the span of the violation is known, production 
quantities or list or transaction prices can sometimes be located for some industries. 
Among the more useful trade magazines and newsletters are Chemical Market 
Reporter, Oil and Gas Journal, and similar publications available on major business-
and-law search engines (Factiva, LexisNexis). 
 
Third, a small number of academic and government researchers have been compiling 
similar data sets. Among the most useful are working papers by Levenstein and Suslow 
(2001, 2002) and Levenstein, Suslow, and Oswald (2003). A useful government 
publication is OECD (2002) and its annual competition-law reports by members. And of 
course we have built upon data collected in the authors’ previous publications (e.g., 
Connor 2003). 
 
Summary of Numbers of Observations 
 
There are a total of 283 private international cartels in the sample (Table A).
14  Nearly 
half (47%) of the cartels operated within Europe: 20% across two or more Member 
States of the EU, and 24% within the borders of single nations of Western (24%) or 
Central (3%) Europe.
15  One-fourth of the sample consists of global cartels. One-sixth of 
                                                            
14 There are two markets (German cement, stamps) with two episodes; otherwise, all observations have 
single episodes. On the definition of cartel episodes, see Levenstein and Suslow (2006: 54-56). 
15 This category may be overstated at the cost of the EU-wide cartels because since about 2000 the EC 
has pursued a policy of devolution of antitrust enforcement. Cases formerly handled by DG-COMP in 
Brussels are now being referred for prosecution to national competition authorities. In at least three 8 
the international cartels confined their activities to North America. Most of the remaining 
35 cases refer to cartels active only in Korea, Japan, Brazil, and Australia.
16 The 
geographic distribution of the sample does not necessarily reflect the true location of 
international cartel activity.  Rather, the distribution is the result of variation in tolerance 
of cartels by national business cultures, differing degrees of effectiveness of detection of 
price fixing by antitrust authorities, and the assertiveness of public reporting of antitrust 
violations.
17  We expect the proportion of international cartels discovered outside North 
America will rise in the next few years.  
 
Table A. Numbers of Cartels, by Location, Industry, and Legal Status 
Geographic location:  Number Percent 
North America  46  16 
EU-wide 56  20 
Nations of Western Europe  68  24 
Central and Eastern Europe  7  3 
Asia   20  7 
Oceania 4  1 
Other (Africa 2, Latin America 9)  11  4 
Global 71  25 
    
Industry:    
Agricultural and forestry raw materials  6  2 
Minerals 2  1 
Food, beverage, tobacco products  19  7 
Paper and printing  14  5 
Organic chemicals  61  22 
Inorganic chemicals  18  6 
Petroleum products  11  4 
Rubber and plastic  14  5 
Stone, clay, graphite, and glass products  23  8 
Metals, mostly fabricated  14  5 
Machinery and electronic devices  17  6 
Other manufactures  18  6 
Construction 14  6 
Transportation services  16  6 
Communication services  13  5 
Distribution 11  4 
Other services  9  3 
    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
markets characterized by geographically localized markets (beer, retail gasoline, and cement), 
investigations of similar alleged violations have been conducted by multiple Member States.    
16 These cases do not include five prosecutions of global cartels by these jurisdictions. 
17 Tolerance is relatively high in Asia and Europe, but is changing fast in Europe and some countries of 
Asia (e.g., Korea). The first corporate leniency program was adopted in the United States and became 
effective only from about 1995 (Connor 2001). Similarly effective programs elsewhere began to turn up 
large numbers of confessions by cartelists only from about 2001 or 2002. Antitrust authorities other than 
the DOJ and the European Commission have notably stepped up publicity of cartel cases since around 
2000, and the local business presses seem to have shown more competence and interest in reporting 
secisions. 9 
    
Legal status:    
Government fines imposed   175  62 
Other financial sanctions  18  6 
Consent decree or warning  10  4 
Investigation closed without penalties  13  5 
Investigation incomplete 
a 67  24 
    
TOTAL 28  100 
Source: Spreadsheet dated October 2006. 
a) Includes private damages suits with no settlements announced 
 
More than 200 of the 283 cartels occupied various branches of the manufacturing 
sector. Of these, more than 38% are chemical intermediates
18 and 11% products made 
from nonmetallic minerals. No other branch of manufacturing accounted for more than 
7% of the sector. In contrast with international cartels from the first half of the 20
th 
century, modern international cartels more frequently appear (25% of the sample) in the 
service sector and few are seen colluding on raw materials (3%). 
 
Our sample includes a large backlog of cartels believed to be under investigation with 
no known resolution of the legal actions (24% of the 283 observations).
19 Of the 216 
cases investigated where a decision has been made somewhere in the world, only 6% 
were closed without a published warning or monetary penalty. Most sampled cartels 
(72%) have been found guilty by courts of law or administrative commissions. Of the 
203 sanctioned cartels, 9% were sanctioned solely by settlements negotiated private 
plaintiffs,
20 and 5% of the government prosecutions ended with warnings or consent 
decrees rather than fines.  
 
Besides the cartels themselves, we have collected information on the names of 
corporate and individual price-fixers. The number of corporations and other business 
entities found guilty or charged with violations is 1540. This number includes parent 
groups as well as their subsidiaries.  On the one hand, 1540 is an over count because 
some of the corporations are double counted because of recidivism.  On the other hand, 
1540 is an undercount because on-going investigations frequently do not reveal the 
                                                            
18 We treat the vitamins cartels as 16 separate cartelized markets (see Connor 2006a), whereas other 
cartel researchers count them as one cartel (Levenstein and Suslow 2006: footnote 46) 
19 By “investigation” we mean an official decision by an antitrust authority to open a probe or, if that has 
closed, a continuing unresolved private damages suit. Most of the investigations are known because of 
semi-public raids. Many other cartel investigations occur in secret until a decision is announced. In 2006 
the DOJ had about 60 grand juries empanelled to hear international cartel cases, and the EC was known 
to have received about 80 amnesty applications for cartel violations (few of them acted upon). If no 
announcement can be found five years after one is opened, we assume that an official investigation has 
been terminated. 
20 The 9% figure is very likely an undercount because negotiated settlements may be accompanied by 
unpublished state or federal court decisions. Large class-action settlements are usually trumpeted by 
Internet web sites or on the Web pages of the plaintiffs’ lead counsel; however, monetarily small cartel 
payouts or settlements involving only cy pres payments often go unreported by the press.  10 
targets and because the press releases of antitrust authorities sometimes fail to list 
individually all the companies that were sanctioned.
21 
 
Temporal Patterns: Launch Dates and Duration 
 
By about 1993-1995 the Antitrust Division of the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ) had 
made the prosecution of cartels its highest enforcement priority (Connor 2004). 
Moreover, since 1997 the majority of guilty pleas and fines for price fixing have come 
from corporations headquartered outside the United States. In the European Union, 
reorganizations of the Directorate-General for Competition (DG-COMP) and statements 
by the Commissioners for Competition indicate that fighting cartels has been the highest 
priority since the late 1990s.
22  Many other national antitrust authorities echo these 
sentiments.    
 
The number of international cartel  s discovered has been rising nearly every year since 
the 1980s (Figure 1).  The numbers shown are what we term the “dates of first notice,” 
i.e., the first year that either an investigation or a sanction
23 was announced or leaked to 
the press.  The total number of legal actions took notable jumps in 1992, 1998
24, 1999, 
2002, and 2004.  The DOJ and EC have jockeyed for first place in the cartel-sanctions 
race.  While compared to the EU in the early 1990s the US was slow to act, it overtook 
the EU around 1995.  However since 2001, the EC has pulled out ahead. Since 2000-
2002, the share of cartel discoveries by the US and EC have declined as sanctions 
imposed by other antitrust authorities have risen in importance.  
   
                                                            
21 An extreme example is the huge construction-sector investigation by the Netherlands Antitrust Authority 
(NMa). Only 15 company names have been announced publicly, but 400 companies are being fined or 
offered leniency. In the Eastern German ready-mix concrete case, only 14 out of 69 punished firms’ 
names were released by the Bundeskartellamt.  
22 Despite these pronouncements, annual reports of the two authorities seem to show that the largest 
allocation of effort is in the area of merger control.   
23 In the US and Canada, if fines are announced on several dates, it is the first dated that is recorded in 
our sample. 
24 Investigations of most of the US vitamins cases were announced in this year; most US and EU 
prosecutions of these 16 related cartels took place in 1999 and 2001, respectively. The DOJ seems to 
count the vitamins prosecutions as one to three cases, but the EU treated each cartel as a separate 
violation. 11 














































Total Discovered US Prosecutions EU Decisions
 
Figure 1. Number of International Cartels Discovered (3-Year Moving Average) 
 
Data on the longevity of more than 230 cartels is shown in Appendix Table 23. One 
cartel that persisted through two world wars and multiple changes in competition laws 
endured for 95 years. Median duration was 5.0 years and mean duration 6.4 years. The 
longest lasting cartels were the global (6.0 median years) and EU-wide (5.5) types. The 
cartels from single nations of Western Europe endured only 3.5 years; Asian, Eastern 




While these trends tend to comport with the views of antitrust officials, lawyers, and 
other observers about changing enforcement priorities, the rising trend in total 
discoveries could in part reflect greater understanding of and attention to the world’s 
business and legal press. 
 
In common with nearly all other empirical studies on cartels, this paper considers only 
known cartels.  Specifically, the data set comprises only private cartels whose 
participants were aware of the illegality of their actions in at least some of the 
jurisdictions in which the cartel operated.  These cartels were clandestine, and 
members typically attempted to cover up or destroy evidence of their meetings and 
communications.  Suggestions in the cartel literature are that only about 10% to 30% of 
all such conspiracies are discovered and punished (Connor 2003:62).  Undiscovered 
cartels may be more durable or differ in some other economic characteristics, but it is 
also possible that discovery is tied only to managerial personality characteristics (e.g., 
the tendency to become a whistle-blower) that are distributed disproportionately to 
discovered cartels. If the latter is true, then the discovered cartels in this report may be 
representative of the majority of cartels that are hidden. 
 12 
 
3. The Biggest Cartels 
 
In this section we examine cartel size by the value of sales revenues in the affected 
market during the collusive period.  Nominal cartel revenues are converted to US dollars 
with the annual average interbank exchange rates for the collusive period.
25 Real 2005 
sales are computed using the Producer Price Indexes (PPIs) for the United States, for 
several major economies of Europe, or the mean of these two PPIs using the middle 
year of the collusive period as the base year (see Box). 
Ranked by Affected Sales 
 
The top 40 biggest cartels, measured in real 2005 affected sales, are shown in Figure 2.  
The sample is highly positively skewed. The top 40 cartels range in size from $8.5 
billion to $97 billion.  Sixteen of these cartels have affected markets with greater than 
$20 billion of sales. 
 
Biggest cartel affected total sales







Total real sales ($ billions)
 
Figure 2.  Distribution of the 40 Biggest Cartels by Real 2005 Affected Sales 
 
Intuitively one would expect that cartels that global cartels have larger sales than more 
regional cartels. As can be seen in Figure 3, four of the top ten cartels
26 and half of the 
top 20 were in the global category.  Most of the rest of the top 40 were active only in 
Western Europe or North America.  Western European and global cartels each 
                                                            
25 In cases where affected sales are not revealed, we assume umbrella pricing and use total industry 
sales in the appropriate region. A few cartels were under investigation as of 2005. 
26 The first four are publication paper (global), high voltage cable (Germany), commercial insurance 
brokers (US), SRO construction (Netherlands), in descending order. 13 
represent 37.5% of the sales of 40 biggest cartels and the US is responsible for 20%. 
Surprisingly, none of the top 40 biggest cartels were active only in Asia.  Two cartels 
from South America and Oceania were at places 36 and 28, respectively.   
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Figure 3. The 40 Biggest Cartels by Location 
Projected Sales 
 
As discussed above, a frequent limitation in cartel research is the clandestine nature of 
cartels.  The majority of private cartels never come to light.  Some antitrust authorities 
keep their investigations and decisions confidential and most reveal very little about the 
economic dimensions of penalized cartels. Similarly, when allegations of price fixing 
surface, most companies try to minimize publicity about their involvement. Large 
antitrust sanctions receive ample publicity by the business press, but decisions about 
smaller cartels may go unreported.  
 
These points apply especially to information about reporting of affected sales. There 
may be publicly accessible information available for broadly defined industries (e.g., 
amino acids), but cartels often cartelized rather finely defined products (e.g., feed-grade 
lysine). Therefore, to provide a comprehensive estimate of total cartel impacts, we 
decided to estimate the unreported sales in markets where collusion is known to have 
occurred.  A simple expected value method
27 allows us to estimate that affected sales in 
                                                            
27 The underlying assumptions of the expected value model are: 1) A colluding cartel needs market power 
in order to collude. Therefore it is assumed that all cartels within each industry have a similar 
concentration level which means that the number of participating firms is irrelevant. 2) Since all data is 
within a short time frame (1990-2005) only duration, not time of collusion, matters. 3) Real sales are linear 
and each industry shares the same intercept and slope.  4) The mean duration for a cartel is 5 years 
which is used for duration where duration is unknown. See Helmers (2006). 14 
46 markets with unknown sales are $763 billion.
28  Total known and projected sales of 
the 283 international cartels in our sample are $2.1 trillion.  
By Geographic Location 
 
Cartel size varies according to geographic scope (Figure 4). The chart counts the 
number of cartels for which we have sales data
29 and shows mean and median real 
2005 sales. 
 
The Western European cartels are the most numerous (67 observations)  and have 
median affected sales of $2.85 billion, the second-largest category in the figure. This 
category includes 30 relative large EU-wide cartels (median of $4.7 billion in affected 
sales) and 37 smaller cartels ($1.5 billion) that were active in only one nation of Western 
Europe. The very large sizes of the EU-wide cartels reflect the frequency with which 
collusion is reinforced by EU trade associations, the European Commission’s targeting 
of shipping conferences, and their long duration.
30 
 
There were 52 global cartels with global sales data available, the second-largest 
geographic type of cartel. Despite their greater geographic spread, the median affected 
sales size of global cartels ($2.64 billion) is only slightly larger than those that confined 
their operations to Western Europe. Indeed, the global cartels are on average 
considerably smaller (44% smaller) than the EU-wide cartels.  
 
Naturally, cartels confined to single nations tend to be the smallest type, with those 
operating only in the United States, Canada, or both countries among the smallest of 
all.
31 The 40 North American cartels’ median affected sales were just shy of $900 
million. Even though the North American market is about equal in GDP to the EU 
market, the average North American cartel is only one-fifth as large. 
 
 
                                                            
28 Projections are based on expectations of duration where duration is unknown and where sales are 
calculated using regional averages within each separate industry. 
29 We have sales data for 177 (63%) of the 283 cartels in the full sample. 
30 The mean duration of the EU-wide cartels is 7.2 years, 10 to 15% longer than the whole sample. 
31 Because of their small numbers, it is perilous to compare the median sizes of cartels operating in 
Eastern Europe, Africa, or Latin America. 15 
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Figure 4.  Geographic Distribution of Cartels by Number & Sales. 
 
The disparity in Figure 4 between mean and median sales for the three largest 
geographic types of cartels suggests that the sales are highly positively skewed. This 
impression is reinforced by Figures 5 to 7. Smaller regions exhibit more equality of size 
distribution.
32 The United States and Europe in particular, have a more unequal 
distribution of cartel sizes.   
 
In the United States, figure US, the largest cartelized markets are publication or 
“magazine” paper (under investigation), “prestige” cosmetics, and insurance brokers, in 
descending order.  In Western European there are by three major cartels that are $20 to 
$60 billion bigger than the rest.  These markets are German high-voltage cable, 
construction in the Netherlands, and the EU-wide cement cartel, in descending order. 
The German cable cartel – an extreme case in our sample --is so large ($80 billion) 
because it was formed in 1902 and endured for 95 years, thereby resulting in a very 
large adjustment for inflation.
33 Sales for the Dutch construction-industry bidding 
conspiracy (the “SRO” groups) were large because the bidding organization funneled 
virtually all tenders in the Netherlands for 12 years beginning in 1980 
                                                            
32 One measure of inequality of distributions is the Gini coefficient, which yields a number between zero 
and one, the former meaning perfectly even and the latter very distorted.  These regions have the 
following Gini distributions: USA 0.82, Total 0.74, EU 0.74, and other countries 0.66. 
33 The real affected sales figure of this cartel is strongly understated. Following the lead of the 
Bundeskartellamt, the German antitrust authority, we assumed that the cartel began in 1958, the first year 
of the current German antitrust law. Nominal sales were estimated to be $29 billion for 1958-1997. The 
real 2005 sales figure is derived from the earliest year we could obtain a European PPI, which is 1974. 
Had we extended the affected period back to 1902 under a no-growth scenario and used an appropriate 
1950 PPI, 2005 affected sales would exceed $350 billion.  16 
Affected Sales in the United States







US real sales ($ millions)
 
Figure 5. Distribution of U.S. Real 2005 Affected Sales 
Affected sales in the European Union
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Figure 6. Distribution of EU Real 2005 Affected Sales 
 
 17 
Affected Sales in other countries









Figure 7. Distribution of Real 2005 Affected Sales in Africa, Asia, Latin                         
America, and Eastern Europe. 
 
Sales by Product Type and Industry 
 
Cartelized markets tend to produce a limited range of product types and industries (cf., 
Table A and Figure 8). As in the past, modern international cartels sell mostly (79% of 
total sales) manufactured goods. Cartels selling industrial intermediate goods 
accounted for 62% of total 2005 affected sales and an even higher proportion (74%) in 
North America. However, capital inputs are only infrequently the object of collusion 
outside of Western Europe, where they accounted for 17% of EU affected sales. 
 
The second most cartelized type of product is services, which accounts for 21% of 
affected sales. Services cartels comprise a relatively small share of the North America 
cartels, whereas they are more common in the rest of the world. Consumer 
manufactures account for 10% of all affected sales. The smallest type of cartelized 
product is raw materials.     18 
Sales by industry type
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Figure 8. Distribution of Real 2005 Affected Sales by Cartel Product Type 
 
 Sales by industry groups are shown in Tables 21 and 22 in the Appendix. In the 
manufacturing sector (75% of total sales), chemicals is the leading industry (32% of 
manufactures’ sales). This is followed by nonmetallic minerals (20%), paper and printing 
(15%), and electronic devices (11%). Services account for 22.8% of total sales, and the 
most important services are construction (35% of service sales); finance, insurance, and 
banking (27%); and communication services (18%). 
 19 
 
4. Cartel Overcharges 
 
The principal objective of most cartels is to increase the joint profits of the cartel’s 
members.
34 Raising selling prices above the prices that would be observed in the 
market in absence of cartel conduct is the most common method of attaining supra-
normal profits.
35  The price effects of cartels are measured by the difference between 
observed market price and the “but-for price” during the collusive period.
36  To easily 
compare the price effects across cartels, this difference may be divided by the but-for 
price (the overcharge rate) or by the observed market price (the Lerner Index of market 
power). In this report, we show the overcharge rate.
37  
 
Amounts, Nominal and Real 
 
Our estimates of the dollar overcharges are shown in Table B. There are 209 unique 
observations.  For most of the 34 global cartels, there are five overcharges available, 
three for the United States, Canada, and the European Union
38, one for the world, and a 
residual category largely consisting of East Asia and several less industrialized 
continents. However, for some global cartels only one or two estimates are available. 
Estimates in the first four columns of the table contain overcharges generated both by  
 
Table B. Summary of Known Cartel Dollar Overcharges by Region 
a 
Jurisdictions Total  Item 
U.S. Canada  EU 
Other 
Regions  Global World 
         
Number 50  31 62 32 34  106
    
Million Current 
U.S. dollars  39,977.4 711.8 56,290.7 7844.5 --  161,890.3
    
Million Real 2005 
U.S. dollars  54,001.4 974.5 99,459.3 10,185.3 98,285.1  225,086.8
    
Million Real  1080  31 1604 318 2586.4  2123
                                                            
34 Many cartels established in the interwar period (1920-1939) claimed to pursue a price stabilization goal 
rather than improved collective profits. There is some empirical evidence to support this purpose 
(Levenstein and Suslow 2004). However, as many of these cartels operated in the Great Depression, 
during which prices frequently were falling, “stabilization” was in fact an attempt to prevent prices from 
falling as fast as natural market forces would have caused them to fall.   
35 Alternatively, if the cartel exercises oligopsony power, then the objective will to be to lower the price of 
a purchased input. Also, a cartel may try to enhance long-run profits by preventing market entry or 
slowing supply expansion by producers that are not members of the cartel. The latter conduct is most 
often regarded as an ancillary objective to control of market price.  
36 The but-for price is often called the competitive benchmark. It may be the price expected price under 
perfect competition, or it may be the price that members of the cartel would charge as a result of tacitly 
collusive conduct.  
37 This is the ratio generally preferred in legal writings; it may range negative to positive infinity. The 
Lerner Index is more common in the writings of economists; it can vary from zero to nearly one or from 
0% to almost 100%. There is a simple formula that converts one index into the other. 
38 The EU is almost coextensive with Western Europe, but in most cases sales and overcharges are 
reported for the European Economic Area.  20 
Dollars per cartel 
(mean) 
    
% of real dollars 
among regions  33% 0.6% 60% 6% 0%  --
% of real dollars 
total  24.0% 0.4% 44.3% 4.5% 26.9% 
b 100%
Source: Appendix Tables 6 to 10. 
-- = Not available 
a)  Based on affected sales in the region. The first four columns include regional overcharges by global cartels. 
Global cartel overcharge are a sub set of the world overcharges. In many cases “World” overlaps with the 
region; in some cases, only a world estimate is available for a global cartel. 
b)  This ratio represents overcharges for which only global estimates are available; the remaining 73% of real 
overcharges are duplicated at the regional level. 
 
purely national conspiracies
39 and by jurisdictional price effects from global cartels.   
Details are shown in Appendix Tables 6 to 10. 
 
 
Calculating Real Sales, Overcharges, and Penalties               
 
We display these figures in “real” 2005 U.S. dollars. We start with the nominal 
value of sales or overcharges and adjust for inflation and for the time value of 
money. If a cartel was located in North America, the U.S. Producer Price 
Index (PPI) for the mid point of the cartel’s life is divided into the nominal value 
of sales revenues or overcharges. PPIs for Europe and the world were used 
for other cartel locations. 
 
If there were fines or settlements paid, then the opportunity cost of money 
(prime bank lending rate + 1%) is calculated from the middle year of cartel 
activity until the year when the fines were paid using a Prime Rate deflator. 
(That is, we assume that the defendants invested their illegal profits in a 
conservative asset and that plaintiffs deserve prejudgment interest because 
they would have invested the same in the absence of an overcharge). The 
Prime Rate deflator is divided into the nominal penalty paid. Then the PPI 
deflator for the appropriate region (North America, Western Europe, or a 
combination of the two) is used to compute the 2005 value of those 






We find that in nominal dollars, more than $160 billion in known damages were inflicted 
by the cartels in our sample. However, it is more appropriate to express historical data 
in “real” terms that corrects for the time value of money (see Box). The total known 
overcharges converted to 2005 U.S. dollars are more than $262 billion.
40  The typical 
                                                            
39 Some may have been sub national in scope, in which case the affected sales will be sub national also. 
Similarly, if only one or a few Member States of the EU were affected by a cartel, only the smaller 
overcharges are shown.  
40 Using projected total sales, it is likely that total overcharges exceeded $550 billion. 21 
cartel caused more than $2 billion in economic harm,
41 with the global type of cartel the 
most destructive. The overcharges in the rest of the world appear to be the smallest, but 
this is an illusion that arises from data constraints. For example, the overcharge 
estimates from Asia are derived mainly from reports of the newer antitrust authorities in 
Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and the like – smaller economies compared to the EU and 
United States. 
 
Intensity by Regions 
 
The ratios of cartel overcharges to affected sales are summarized in Table C. There are 
slightly fewer overcharge rates than amounts because several percentages were 
reported for markets for which sales could not be determined. We focus on median 
ratios because they are not symmetrically distributed. 
 
Median overcharges fall within a fairly narrow range of 24 to 29% of affected 
commerce.
42  There is a surprising constancy of price effects across North America, 
Europe, and other continents. However, global cartels exhibited 20% greater price 
effects than other international cartels, a result consistent with previous research 




Table C. Summary of Cartel Overcharge Rates by Region 
a 
Total  Item No.  Am.  Canada  EU  Other 
Regions  Global World 
            
Number 49  29  50  29 34  96 
            
Median %  24  24  24  29  29  27 
            
Mean %  76  28  32  75  25  57 
            
 
Source: Appendix Tables 1 to 5. 
a) Based on affected sales in the region. The first four columns include regional overcharges by global cartels. Global 
cartel overcharge are a sub set of the world overcharges. In many cases “World” overlaps with the region; in some 







                                                            
41 This is the income transfer only; the dead-weight social loss is not computed but may add additional 
harm of 10 to 30%. 
42 Note that these are equivalent to the price-cost margins (Lerner Indexes) favored by economic 
analysts, not the mark-ups usually favored by legal writers. A 24% overcharge margin corresponds to a 
32% mark-up on a benchmark price. 
43 This is not surprising as there is a considerable overlap between the two data sets for observations 
since 1990. 22 
Intensity by Product Type 
 
Median overcharge rates are further analyzed according to the type of cartelized 
product in Table D.
44  The great majority of cartelized products are industrial 
intermediate goods – chemicals, metals, plastics, and the like purchased in bulk by 
manufacturers for further processing. It is noteworthy that 30 of the 34 global cartels 
dealt with industrial intermediates. Overcharge rates for these products vary from 21 to 
29% across geographic zones of activity. Raw materials and capital goods appear to 
have lower cartel margins, but caution is advised as the numbers of observations for 
these categories are quire limited.   
 
Table D. Median Average Overcharge Rates by Product Type and Location
Item No. US  Can. EU  Other Global  World
   Percent of nominal sales 
Raw Materials  3 -- -- -- -- 23.9  23.9
Industrial Intermediates  152 23.6 26.9 21.0 25.8 28.9 28.0
Industrial capital goods  9 -- -- 28.9 5.2 --  8.8
Consumer, undifferentiated  39 -- -- 61.5 9.0 --  49.9
Consumer, differentiated  17 1256.7 -- -- 10.0 --  42.0
Services 63 20.0 4.8 22.1 22.5 9.8  17.1
  
Mean 
a 283 113.0 20.4 27.5 21.1 23.3  27.2
              
Source: Appendix Tables 1 to 5.  
-- = Not available 
Note: Global is a sub set of World. 




The overcharge rates for consumer products are distinctly higher than the average 
cartel price effects, whereas the rates for services are much lower. Indeed, a general 
point is that the overcharge rates appear to be correlated with the typical historical profit 
margins of those sectors.  This pattern suggests that cartels may consider their 
historical profit rates when deciding to enter or form a cartel; perhaps nothing less than 
a doubling or trebling of profits is worth the risk of discovery and punishment. 
Geographic variation in consumer goods and services is more pronounced than for 
industrial goods.  
                                                            
44 Recall that the cartels are shown by industry group in Table A. We do not have enough observations to 
show meaningful average overcharges at the industry level of detail. 23 
 
 




Punishment of cartels is predicated on the notion that future attempts to commit the 
same crime will be thwarted. This is the principle of “specific deterrence.”
45 Cartel 
sanctions are often higher for recidivists. Under fining guidelines instituted by the EU in 
2006, price-fixing recidivism will automatically raise a violator’s fine by 100%. 
 
Recidivism bedevils the international cartel scene. Table E lists the 11 companies with 
the worst records as serial price fixers: each has been caught ten times or more 
engaging in international hard-core cartels. Most of the 11 are conglomerates with 
interests in petroleum or chemical manufacturing. Seven of the 11 corporations were 
members of the great vitamins cartels (Connor 2006d).
46  Nine of the top 11 recidivists 
hail from the EU, and the remaining two are Japanese firms. These 11 companies are 
simply the proverbial “tip of the iceberg,” because we have found 174 documented 
instances of cartel recidivism; of these 86 companies recorded three or more cartel 
violations (Appendix Table 11). 
 
 
Table E. The 11 Largest International Cartel Recidivists, 1990-2005 
 
Company (other & former names)  HQ 
Number of  
Convictions 
    
BASF AG  DE  26 
Total S.A. (TotalFinaElf, Atofina)  FR  18 
Hoffmann-La Roche  CH  17 
Akzo Nobel  NL  14 
Aventis (Hoechst, Rhone-Poulenc, Sanofi)  FR/DE  14 
ENI (Ente Nazionale, AGIP, Syndial, Polimeri)  IT  14 
Shell (Royal Dutch Shell)  NL  14 
Degussa (Huels)  DE  13 
Bayer AG  DE  11 
Mitsubishi Corp.  JP  10 
Mitsui & Co. Ltd.   JP  10 
Source: Appendix Table 11 
 
Six countries account for the majority of recidivists (Table F). European companies 
account for the lion’s share of cartel recidivists with three or more convictions: 49 
European companies account for 64% of all violations. German, Swiss, and Dutch 
                                                            
45 “General deterrence” is the effect that punishment of one party has in discouraging the same crime by 
other parties. 
46 Note that unlike some other analysts, but following the lead of the EU, we opted to count membership 
in the 16 vitamins “families” as separate violations. 24 
companies are especially egregious recidivists. Thirteen companies from Japan and 
Korea accounted for 16% of the violations in the table. The absence of U.S. and 
Canadian companies from the list of leading cartels recidivists is noteworthy. However, 
when one dips below the top 11 to companies with three to nine violations, one finds 18 
recidivists from North America with a cumulative total of 74 violations. 
 
 
Table F. Headquarters International Cartel Recidivists with Three or 
more Violations, 1990-2005 
 






      
No. America:  18 74  17 
      
USA 17  71  16 
Canada 1  3  1 
      
Western Europe:  49 278  64 
      
Germany 14  88  20 
Switzerland 5  50  12 
Netherlands 7  49  11 
France 4  31  7 
Italy 2  28  6 
UK 7  28  6 
Finland 4  19  4 
Belgium 2  14  3 
Sweden 2  6  1 
Denmark 1  6  1 
Spain 1  4  1 
      
Other:  17 81  19 
      
Japan 8  47  11 
Korea 5  20  5 
Kuwait 1  5  1 
Libya 1  3  1 
South Africa  1  3  1 
Australia 1  3  1 
      
Total  86 433  100 





Our compilation of cartel recidivists is surely understated for several reasons.  First, we 
have no formal record of non-international cartel activity, which is considerable in 
Europe, Japan, and jurisdictions with ineffective anticartel enforcement. Second, our 
sampling starts with cartels that experienced antitrust legal actions after January 1990, 
and other sources, such as EU decisions from earlier years, indicate additional price-
fixing violations by some of the 174 companies already identified as recidivists. Third, 
fewer than 30% of all cartels are sanctioned, so the number of undiscovered instances 
of recidivism may well be double or triple the number of known convictions. 
 
Speed of Discovery 
 
There is informal evidence that antitrust authorities are uncovering secret international 
cartels with greater alacrity over time. Figure 8 plots a date we call the “date of first 
notice” against the difference between that date and the date the cartel was formed. 
First notice is often a day that a raid is conducted in some jurisdiction (some are 
simultaneous raids in several jurisdictions), sometimes it is the day the existence of a 
grand jury is revealed, and sometimes it is the day the first (or only) antitrust authority 
announces a decision after a secret investigation.  
 





































Figure 8. Years Between Cartel Formation and Discovery 
 
The average delay between cartel formation and first notice is 4.7 years. However, the 
delay is clearly decreasing over time from a high of 7.7 years in 1990 to a low of 1.3 
years in 2003. Because a cartel almost always stops colluding on or before the date of 
first notice, cartel duration seems to be declining during the 1990-2005 period. 
However, this apparent trend may be due to compositional changes in the sample. It 
contains a higher proportion if discoveries by newer antitrust authorities in the later 
years, and these authorities seem to discover mostly less durable conspiracies. 
 26 
Trends in Cartel Sanctions 
 
Figure 9 displays the temporal pattern of fines imposed on and settlements negotiated 
by private international cartels everywhere in the world. The penalties are converted to 
real 2005 U.S. dollars and are recorded in the year the decisions are made.
47  For most 
cartels, such as those discovered to have been active in Western Europe, only one 
government conviction occurred.  However, for many North American cartels, a criminal 
conviction in the United States or Canada (often both) would be typically be followed by 
private suits that frequently took two or three years to be settled.
48 Finally, in the case of 
global cartels, North American antitrust fines would be paid, and two to four years later 
private settlements would be announced and the EU would decide on fines. Because of 
these lags and a desire to smooth the observations, we show the three-year moving 
averages of the penalties. 
 
Cartel penalties accelerated rapidly from 1990-91 (when they were below $2 million in 
each year) to the 1998-2000 peaks (when they hovered around $2 billion).  These peak 
years are strongly affected by the huge vitamins cartels. In 2001-2004, penalties have 
remained at or above $1 billion. It is too early to tell whether this relatively steady 
pattern in the early 2000s will become a permanent feature of the global antitrust-
enforcement scene, or weather it is merely a pause before the trend continues its 
upward climb.   
 
 
                                                            
47 The dates for cartel fines are clear and unambiguous, but those for private settlements sometimes 
require judgment. For example, for most of the vitamins cartels the DOJ and CCB fines were announced 
in the last eight months of 1999 (Connor 2006e). The first and largest U.S. federal class-action settlement 
was approved in late 2000; because it was the key event, this is the date recorded for all private 
settlements in the United States.  However, there were many U.S. opt-outs who settled in 2003 and 2004, 
and the Canadian class-actions were settled in 2004.    
48 There are other temporal patterns as well. In some cases private settlements preceded the payment of 
fines, and in a significant number of cases private civil suits were successful for plaintiffs even though 
























Figure 9. Monetary Penalties (Real 2005 U.S. Dollars) Imposed on International Cartels 





Largest Cartel Sanctions 
 
Figure 10 shows the pattern of the 40 largest real monetary penalties imposed on 
international cartels from 1990 to 2005. The penalties, which vary from $93 to $1252 















Figure 10. Forty Largest Price-Fixing Penalties, 1990-2005 
 
 
Table G assembles a list of the 34 cartels with monetary sanctions above $100 million, 
ranked by 2005 US dollars. The 34 cartels account for 19% of the total number of 
sanctioned cartels, but 78% of the $13.5 billion in monetary value of corporate 
sanctions. Note that the fines expressed in 2005 dollars are only 53% of the $25 billion 
in nominal penalties imposed. The large reduction reflects the fact that cartelists are 
permitted to pay their fines and settlements without regard to pre-judgment interest. 
 
Half of the 34 most penalized cartels were global cartels. The most typical highly 
penalized cartel is a global cartel that was fined by the DOJ, CCB, and EU and later 
negotiated a civil settlement with direct purchasers in North America. The Vitamins, 
Graphite Electrodes, Lysine, Citric Acid, and Art Auction Houses cases fit this pattern. A 
second category consists of cartels sanctioned solely by the EU: Plasterboard, TACA, 
and Methionine are examples of this type.  Third, a few of the top 34 penalized cartels 
were fined by only one national authority: Germany imposed impressive fines on its 
Concrete and Cement cartels, Sweden on an Asphalt cartel, and Korea on two domestic 
cartels. The Netherlands antitrust authority NMa is still prosecuting hundreds of 













NO  Tobacco Leaf, US  1162.28 1753.00 
GLOBAL  Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 992.39 1129.00 
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  923.80 1962.00 
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  708.46 1502.10 
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  631.18 1305.45 
GLOBAL DRAMs 
m 601.29 750.00 
WE  Cement I, Germany   495.11 798.00 
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  428.83 912.50 
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  418.97 1071.60 
GLOBAL  Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  357.87 624.95 
WE Construction,  Netherlands 
m 260.66 401.00 
WE Plasterboard  245.58 478.30 
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  240.49 463.60 
NO  High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  239.15 611.00 
GLOBAL Methionine  218.24 555.20 
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  215.13 480.59 
AS  Digital switches, Israel 
m 189.80 390.83 
GLOBAL Diamonds,  gem  181.00 250.00 
WE Gasoline,  IT  168.42 290.00 
GLOBAL  Rubber Processing Chemicals 
m 153.43 233.20 
NO  Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  152.33 190.00 
GLOBAL  TACA (Europe/No.Atlantic Shipping)  137.94 235.90 
GLOBAL Lysine  137.43 307.95 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  135.77 291.50 
NO  Cosmetics, "prestige," U.S.  135.68 199.00 
WE  Insurance, industrial property, Germany 
m 134.56 171.20 
NO Anti-anxiety  drugs,  US  125.78 174.00 
WE  Copper tubes, plumbing  120.44 268.00 
NO Linerboard,  US  117.61 254.50 
WE  Concrete, Eastern Germany  115.22 192.60 
WE Asphalt,  Sweden 
m 106.47 189.30 
GLOBAL Sorbates  105.84 424.36 
AS  Telephone services, local, Korea  101.80 109.70 
AS  Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  101.33 146.30 
    
Subtotal of 18 vitamins cartels  3,379.6 7,430.8 
Subtotal of 34 largest (by real sanctions)  10,560.3 19,116.6 
Subtotal of smaller 146 cartels  2909.5 6274.1 
    
Total of 180 cases 
a 13,469.7 25,390.7 
      
Source: Table 17 
Superscript m = not all sanctions imposed as of late 2005 
a) There were five cartels (not listed above) fined a total of $97 million by Italy and France 
with inadequate information about the dates of collusion to calculate real fines.   
 
 30 
Because they are distinct products and in some cases were independent conspiracies, 
we have chosen to treat the 18 bulk vitamins cartels as separate observations (see 
Connor 2006a). Some, but not all of the world’s antitrust authorities treated many of 
these cartels as a single infraction.
49 If one aggregates the penalties across the 18 
cartels, the real 2005 global sanctions totaled $3.4 billion, which is an astounding 25.1% 
of all international cartel penalties in 1990-2005. 
 
It is a curious fact that the two greatest penalties were imposed on US-based cartels 
that followed an unusual path: they have not yet been sanctioned by the U.S., EU or 
any other national antitrust authority. Only civil damages cases were brought in U.S. 
courts. The Tobacco Leaf cartel was a bid-rigging case prosecuted by direct purchasers 
in the United States, and Commercial Insurance Brokers was prosecuted first by the 
New York State Attorney General and later by his peers in other states.
50  Additional 
examples of cartels subject only to U.S. civil damages litigation are High Fructose Corn 
Syrup, Linerboard, Cardizem, Anti-anxiety Drugs, and Cosmetics.
51   
 
By Type of Litigation and Jurisdiction 
 
Calculated in real 2005 US dollars, total known penalties imposed on 81 of the global 
international cartels was 7.6 billion, an astounding 56% of the total (Table H). The 
global-cartel penalties originated from 50 criminal convictions in the United States and 
Canada (19.4% of total penalties), 37 civil proceedings (16.3%), and 34 private 
damages cases in North America (28.2%). 
 
One-fifth of the total penalties derived from fines imposed by national authorities on 
cartels with international membership but with activity confined to one nation; of these 
types of cartels, the penalties on 67 cartels from the EU Member States are the 
greatest; the fines of Korea, Israel and the United States are next in importance. Fines 












                                                            
49 The US DOJ and private damages suits in North America generally referred to most of them as a single 
violation, whereas the EU clearly distinguished the cartels as multiple violations.   
50 This case is still being litigated in the United States.  Moreover, there are hints that prosecutions are 
being contemplated in the UK or by the EU, so we have tentatively classified this cartel as global in 
scope. 
51 The Israeli Digital Switches case has yet to be completed; the amount shown may be lower when 
judgment is finalized. The Anti-anxiety Drugs case (a/k/a Mylan Laboratories) is unique because of the 
involvement of the U.S. FTC.  
52 Combining global with EU-wide cartels, the EC originated 15.9% of the world’s penalties on cartels. 
The EC and its Member States accounted for 30% of all international cartel penalties. 31 
Table H. Cartel Sanctions by Litigation Category 
Cartels Penalties 
Cartels Location: Authority  Number 
a Real  2005 
Million Dollars 
Percent 
      
Global: Criminal and Civil  81 
b 7598.9 56.4 
   Criminal (US+CA)  50 1609.9 12.0 
   US States  1 992.4 7.4 
   European Commission  31 1188.2 8.8 
   Australia & Korea  6 12.0 0.1 
   Private Damages Suits  34 
b 3796.4 28.2 
   
EU-wide: EC  55 961.2 7.1 
   
North America:  56 
c 2283.1 17.0 
   US federal  32 181.8 1.4 
   Canada  7 30.8 0.2 
   Joint US and Canada  7 22.0 0.2 
   Private and US States  18 
c 2048.5 15.2 
   
Single-Country Cartels:  109 2627.3 19.5 
   W. Europe: EU Member State  67 1858.5 13.8 
   E. Europe: European Nations  7 94.5 0.7 
   Asia: Asian Nations  20 523.8
 d 3.9 
   Oceania: AU and NZ  4 6.7 0.1 
   Latin American Nations  9 65.4 0.5 
   Africa: US and So. Africa  2 78.4 0.6 
   
TOTAL  180 13,469.7 100.0 
Source: Table 18 
a)The numbers for the locational subtotals (Global, EU-wide, etc.) count cartels with 
one or more litigation actions as one observation. However, the numbers below the 
locational rows count the number of guilty pleas, decisions, or suits. 
b)There were 73 cartels fined and 8 private settlements with no previous government 
fines in any jurisdiction. 
c)There was 46 cartels fined and 10 private settlements with no previous government 
fines in any jurisdiction. 


















    
United States, federal:    
DRAMs 
m 440.9
Graphite Electrodes  227.5
Vitamin E  131.4
Vitamin Premixes  109.5
Rubber Processing Chemicals 
m 76.9
Anti-anxiety drugs, US  75.3
Polychloroprene synthetic Rubber 
m 73.1
Vitamin C  72.8
Construction, USAID in Egypt   55.5
Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping 
m 52.0
 




DRAMs m  160.34
TACA (Europe/No.Atlantic Shipping)  137.94
Copper tubes, plumbing  120.44
Graphite Electrodes  93.04
Paper, carbonless  86.09
Vitamin E  83.60
Euro-Zone banks  71.01
Rubber Processing Chemicals m  59.28
Vitamin A  54.33
Citric Acid  50.45
 
Total fines, 63 cases  2215.69 29.9
 
Canada and Other Jurisdictions: 
 
Insurance brokers, commercial, US m  992.39
Cement I, Germany  495.11
Construction, Netherlands 
m 260.66
Gasoline, IT  168.42
Insurance, industrial property, Germany 
m 134.56
Concrete, Eastern Germany  115.22
Asphalt, Sweden m  106.47
Telephone services, local, Korea  101.80
Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  101.33
Mobile phone operators in NL  82.44
Asphalt paving, Finland  80.69
Cell phones, IT  58.52
Petroleum products, Kazakhstan 
m 51.4133 
 
Total of 99 cases  3402.1 45.9
 
Total fines, 212 cases  7412.6 100
 
Sources: Appendix Tables 12-15. 
Superscript m = not all sanctions imposed as of late 2005 
 
Government fines accounted for 55% of all international cartel penalties, but 52 private-
party damages suits generated at least $6.0 billion in settlements (44% of the total). 
While nearly all of the settlements were an outcome of US treble damages suits, 
including several prosecuted by attorneys general of US states, private cases in 
Canada and Israel were significant. In the case of global cartels, the 34 settlements 
averaged $112 million; somewhat surprisingly, the 18 private suits involving cartels 
operating within North America settled for a similar average of $114 million.  Also 
noteworthy is the fact that 18 of the private suits (35%) were successful even though no 
government convictions preceded the private actions.   
 
Table I lists the leading international-cartel cases prosecuted by the DOJ and CCB as 
criminal cases and civil proceedings by the EU and sundry national antitrust authorities. 
The DOJ obtained fines on 50 international cartels totaling 1.8 billion real 2005 dollars, 
which was 24% of the world-wide total of $7.4 billion in government fines.  Larger still 
were the 63 fines imposed by the EU: $2.2 billion, or 33% of the global total. The largest 
category of prosecutions ($3.4 billion or 46%) were 99 cases by other national and state 
authorities.
53  Of these 212 cases, 17 of the cartel fines exceeded $100 million and 34 
exceeded $50 million for all the participants. 
 
Fines versus Settlements 
 
Government fines comprise slightly more than half (52%) of the total penalties imposed 
on international cartels during 1990-2005. However, private settlements comprise the 
largest single category of world-wide cartels penalties, some 6.5 million real US dollars 
or 48% of all penalties (Table J).  The 55 cases for which we have information is likely 
an undercount, because direct-purchaser payouts are not as widely reported as are 
fines, and indirect-purchaser settlements are even more difficult to locate. Twenty-five 









                                                            
53 The penalties imposed by the DOJ are almost always soon paid to the U.S. Treasury. Many EU 
decisions on cartel fines are appealed, and many of these appeals are successful in obtaining reduced 
fines. However, the fines imposed by the antitrust authorities of several developing countries are never 
paid. 34 
Table J. Largest Private Settlements, 1990-
2005 
Market  Real 2005 
Million Dollars
  
Tobacco Leaf, US  1252.32
Vitamin E  509.73
High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  492.49
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  401.11
Graphite Electrodes  371.37
Vitamin Premixes  348.57
Methionine 234.68
Vitamin A  232.89
Cosmetics, "prestige," U.S.  229.38
Vitamin C  218.66
Citric Acid  209.50
Linerboard, US  198.83
Digital switches, Israel  188.90
Diamonds, gem  181.00
Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  164.13
Beta Carotene  118.91
Vitamin B4, North America  103.56
Lysine 86.81
Anti-anxiety drugs, US  85.30
MSG 72.58
Automotive Refinishing Paint m  63.71
Explosives, commercial, US  59.18
Sorbates 54.85
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  50.89
EPDM, Synthetic Rubber m  50.69
 
Total private settlements, 55 cases 6479.0
 






Intensity of Penalties 
 
Table K summarizes the intensity of cartel sanctions. Each of the 212 government fines 
and 55 settlement amounts is divided by affected sales in the appropriate jurisdiction 
region.
54  If a cartel was active in and sanctioned in two or more jurisdictions, then the 
denominator is expanded to all the affected jurisdictions.  For global cartels world-wide 
sales are employed. 
 
                                                            
54 If a fine was imposed by an authority outside North America or Western Europe on a global cartel, the 
divisor is sales in the rest of the world. We have several cases where sanctions are known but sales are 
not. 35 
We have 345 ratios. Looking at the median ratios, fines are harshest in North America.
55  
Moreover, about two-thirds of the private settlements are added to US or Canadian 
fines, so for a typical cartel that paid both fines and settlements in the United States, 
corporate monetary penalties were 9 to 10% of affected sales. Fines for EU-wide cartels 
averaged only 3% of EU sales, and fines on cartels of other governments (most are 
member States of the EU) were less than half of that. The median penalty on all cartels 
relative to total affected sales is less than 2%.    
 
 
Table K. Real Sanctions Relative to Real 2005 Affected Sales 
Measure 







    
Median %  4.87  4.38 2.98 0.76 4.47  1.82
Mean %  30.89 9.82 29.81 3.42 25.81  21.58
Number (372 total)  45  28   55     25        50    142 
    
Source: Table 19 
a)  If a cartel received only one out of the five sanctions, then this column repeats  
that observation. However, if a cartel was penalized two of more times (e.g., a US fine and a US private 




Table L shows similar calculations to the ones in Table K, but the denominator is 
regional or global overcharges instead of sales.  From the perspective of optimal 
deterrence principles, the sanctions as a proportion of cartel overcharges are superior 
indicators of the quality of antitrust enforcement (Connor 2006c).  As cartel overcharges 
are more difficult to determine, we have fewer such ratios (223) than for the sales ratios. 
These ratios are highly positively skewed (Table 29). 
 
U.S. and Canadian fines, nearly all of them criminal convictions, resulted in the highest 
median average fine ratios (15 to 18%).  The EU’s fine structures are much lower, 
averaging less than 10% of overcharges in the EU market, and the fines of other 
governments lowest of all (about 4%). By far the harshest sanctions were levied by 
private plaintiffs, most of them in North America. Private suits recovered almost two-
fifths of the damages incurred by buyers of cartelized goods. In dollars that reflect the 
time value of money, even when one adds the fines and settlements together, US 
citizens failed to be fully compensated for their cartel injuries. On a world-wide basis, 







                                                            
55 The ratios are highly positively skewed, so the median is a more appropriate average than the mean. 
56 Only 9 of the 87 total ratios exceed 100%. 36 
 
Table L. Real Sanctions Relative to Real 2005 Overcharges 
Measure 







    
Median %  14.98  17.58 9.30 3.99 38.5  20.98
Mean %  23.35  24.3 41.94 55.76 53.7  63.48
Number (241 total)    30       20    32     17        37  87 
    
Source: Table 20 
If a cartel received only one out of the five sanctions, then this column repeats that observation. However, 
if a cartel was penalized two of more times (e.g., a US fine and a US private suit), then this column has a 
unique ratio. All the other columns report unique observations. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This report summarizes the principal features of a unique and timely set of data on 
modern private international cartels discovered anywhere in the world from January 
1990 to the end of 2005. Considerable legal and economic data were collected. 
 
The sample consists of 283 hard-core cartels. Approximately 44% were active only in 
Western Europe, 3% in Eastern Europe, 8% in Asia and Oceania, 16% in North 
America, and 4% in nations of other continents. The remaining 25% of cartels were 
global cartels – those operating across two or more continents.  As for legal status, 24% 
were still being formally investigated in late 2005.  Among those cartels with final 
dispositions, 86% had been required to pay monetary penalties; 5% had been enjoined 
or received warnings or a similar verbal admonishment from a competent antitrust 
authority; and the remaining 6% had seen their investigations closed without any known 
verbal or monetary sanctions.  
 
These cartels were not fragile organizations. One cartel that persisted through two world 
wars and multiple changes in competition laws endured for 95 years. Median duration 
was 5.0 years and mean duration 6.4 years. The longest lasting cartels were the global 
(6.0 median years) and EU-wide (5.5) types. The cartels from single nations of Western 
Europe endured only 3.5 years; Asian, Eastern European, and Latin American cartels 
were also relatively short-lived. 
 
International-cartel discovery rates have been increasing since 1990, from four to six 
per year in the early 1990s to about 35 per year in 2003-2005. Through 2002 the US 
DIJ and European Commission opened the majority of all formal investigations, but 
since then the antitrust authorities of many other jurisdictions have taken the lead.  
 
Affected sales of the sample cartels expressed in real 2005 U.S. dollars are $2.1 trillion; 
about 36% of the total is estimated by a projection method explained in Section 3 of the 
text above. Cartels sizes are highly positively skewed. The largest cartel accumulated 
affected sales of $97 billion over its life time; 20 cartels had sales above $20 billion.  
 
Global cartels had the highest median sales ($2.6 billion) among the more numerous 
types, but those active only in Western Europe were not far behind. In fact, cartels that 
affected sales in several EU countries were on average quite a bit larger ($4.7 billion) 
than global cartels. Those operating in single countries of Western Europe averaged 
affected sales of $1.5 billion and those in North America $900 million.  
 
Seventy-nine percent of the sample’s sales originated from cartels composed of 
manufacturers. The leading industries are chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and 
electronic devices. The next most important cartelized goods are services (21%), and 
the least important is raw materials. By type of products, the major cartelized goods are 
industrial intermediate inputs (62%); capital and consumer goods are seldom cartelized. 
 
International cartels have caused a great deal of economic injuries. Measured from a 
large but incomplete sample of estimates, we find that total overcharges exceeded $200 38 
billion and that the mean cartel overcharge was $2.1 billion. Global cartels were 22% 
more injurious than the average conspiracy. Overcharge rates were surprisingly similar 
in North America and the EU (medians of 24% of affected sales), but the median for 
global types and other jurisdictions was 29% of sales.  As for product types, the 
overcharge rates were notably higher or the small number of consumer-goods cartels 
(median above 40%) and lower for the even fewer capital-goods conspiracies. 
 
Monetary sanctions imposed on international cartelists since 1989 have been the 
highest in antitrust history. Yet, extensive recidivism implies that present cartel 
sanctions are inadequate to deter cartel formation. More than 170 companies were 
price-fixing recidivists during 1990-2005. Indeed, we document 11 instances where 
corporate recidivism occurred from 10 to 26 times. Recidivism is especially common 
among companies headquartered in Western Europe. 
 
Total public and private penalties imposed on 180 of the cartels in 1990-2005 
accumulated to $25.4 billion in nominal terms; however, because of the time value of 
money, real 2005 penalties were only $13.5 billion.  Real penalties in the early 1990s 
totaled less than $2 million per year, accelerated quickly, and peaked at about $2 billion 
annually in 1998-2000. Since then global penalties stabilized at about $1 billion. 
 
Penalties imposed on global cartels accounted for 56% of all real penalties, of which the 
18 vitamins cartels were nearly half. Cartels caught in Europe accounted for 22% of the 
penalties, and North America cartels for 17%. Only about 5% of world wide penalties 
were imposed by authorities in Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Private damages suits in 
North America extracted at least 43% of the total penalties on international cartels.  
 
Using real 2005 figures, we calculated the intensity of monetary sanctions by dividing by 
real sales or real overcharges. The median average penalty/sales ratio varied from 0.8 
to 4.9%, depending on the jurisdiction and type of litigation. As a proportion of damages, 
median fines ranged from about 4% for the Member States of the EU to 15.0% for the 
United Sates, and to 17.6% for Canada. Private plaintiffs obtained 39% of damages 
from international cartelists.  Very few fines or settlements recouped 100% of damages. 
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Glossary of Geographic Abbreviations 
Abbr. Location  Abbr.  Location 
AF Africa  IT  Italy 
AR Argentina  JP  Japan 
AT Austria  LI  Lithuania 
BR Brazil  MX  Mexico 
CA Canada  NL  Netherlands 
CL Chile  NO  Norway 
CN  China  NO AM  North America 
CZ  Czech Republic  NZ   New Zeeland 
DE Germany  OC  Oceania 
EE Eastern  Europe  PT  Portugal 
EG Egypt  RO  Romania 
ES Spain  RU  Russia 
EU European  Union  SW  Sweden 
FI Finland  TW  Taiwan 
FR France  UK  United  Kingdom 
GLOBAL Global  US  United  States 
HU Hungary  WE  Western  Europe 
IL Israel  ZA  South  Africa 






Table 1. U.S. 
a Overcharge Rates, 1990-2005   








































Anti-anxiety drugs, US 
Methylglucamine 
Vitamin C, US imports from China * 
Graphite Electrodes 
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses) 
Linerboard, US 
Aluminum Phosphide, US 
Vitamin B12 
Sulfuric acid, US * 
Sorbates 
Vitamin E 
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4)  
Construction, USAID in Egypt  
Vitamin A 
Corn Glucose Syrup, US 
Vitamin B5 (Calpan) 
Beta Carotene 
Flat glass, U.S. 
Vitamin Premixes 
DRAMs * 





Folic Acid (Vitamin B9) 





Biotin (Vitamin H) 
Vitamin B3 (Niacin) 
Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping * 
Vitamin D 
Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US 
High Fructose Corn Syrup, US 
Methionine 
Carbon Cathode Block 














Paper, thermal fax, US and CA 
Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) European branch 
Tobacco Leaf, US 
Carbon Black * 
Insurance brokers, commercial, US m 
Explosives, commercial, US 
Diamonds, Industrial 
Stamp Auctions (Episode 1) 
  
Median of 49 
Mean of 49 
   75.75% 
Source: Spreadsheet dated 10/15/06 
a) Includes a few cartels that operated in both the United States and Canada (“US and CA”).   




Table 2. Canadian Overcharge Rates, 1990-2005   
Continent Market  Nominal  
dollar ratio
GLOBAL Methylglucamine  75.00%
NO  Insecticide, BT , CA  65.39%
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  56.92%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  48.15%
GLOBAL Sorbates  41.67%
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  38.66%
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  33.33%
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) f  32.93%
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  32.22%
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  31.25%
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  30.71%
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  30.28%
NO  Vitamin B4, North America  27.90%
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  27.21%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  24.16%
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  23.61%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  21.74%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  19.12%
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  18.52%
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  17.82%
GLOBAL Lysine  17.39%
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  15.44%
GLOBAL Vitamin  D  14.00%
GLOBAL Methionine  13.00%
GLOBAL  Carbon Cathode Block  12.50%
NO  Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  10.00%
WE  Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe 9.07%
GLOBAL  Carbon Black m  7.14%
GLOBAL Diamonds,  Industrial  2.95%
  
Median of 29  24.16%
Mean of 29  27.53%
    
NO= No. America, WE= Western Europe 




Table 3. EU-Wide Overcharge Rates, 1990-2005   
Continent Market  Nominal  
dollar ratio
    
WE  Generic drugs, warfarin & penicillin m, UK  265.55%
WE  Infant Formula (Episode 2), Italy  125.00%
WE  Waste collection, Germany m  70.00%
WE  Steel, flat stainless  60.00%
WE  PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) plastic  55.94%
GLOBAL  Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  51.05%
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  50.00%
WE Euro-Zone  banks  50.00%
WE  Cable, high-voltage, Germany  49.07%
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  47.50%
WE Polypropylene  plastic  44.76%
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  38.50%
WE  Compressed gases, NL  37.58%
WE Construction,  Norway  m  37.46%
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) f  33.82%
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  33.03%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  31.33%
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  30.82%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  30.14%
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  29.87%
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  29.49%
WE Steel  beams  25.22%
WE Gasoline,  FR  25.00%
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  24.82%
WE Cartonboard  23.81%
WE Eurocheque,  EU  22.14%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  20.94%
WE  Steel pipes, insulated heating  20.68%
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  20.00%
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  19.39%
GLOBAL Lysine  17.36%
WE Paper,  carbonless  16.90%
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  15.60%
GLOBAL  Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping m  15.00%
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  14.45%
WE Zinc  phosphate  13.33%
WE  Steel tubes ("oil country tubes")  12.03%
WE  Ferry services, English Channel  10.00%
GLOBAL Vitamin  D  9.08%
WE  Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe  8.85%
WE  Construction, Netherlands m  8.80%
WE  Hydro-Electric power equipment, NO  8.76%
WE Gasoline,  Sweden  8.33%
WE  Insurance, industrial property, Germany m 6.97%
GLOBAL  Carbon Black m  6.74%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  6.47%46 
WE  Tobacco processing, Spain  6.09%
WE  Danish air routes  4.77%
WE Gasoline,  IT  3.55%
WE  Construction, SRO, Netherlands  0.00%
  
Median of 50  24.32%
Mean of 50  31.92%
  
NO= No. America, WE= Western Europe 




Table 4. Other Area Overcharge Rates, 1990-2005   
Continent Market  Nominal  
dollar ratio 
    
WE  Construction, public works, France  1776.49%
WE  Infant Formula (Episode 1), Italy  100.00%
EE Cement,  Romania  75.00%
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  59.01%
WE Pharmaceuticals,  cholesterol,  IT  52.38%
WE  Petroleum, Iceland m  50.00%
WE  Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, IT  50.00%
AS  Philippines telecom, US  50.00%
WE British  Sugar  49.91%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  46.04%
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  43.04%
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) f  41.09%
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  37.68%
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  37.06%
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  36.00%
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  33.28%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  32.04%
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  28.74%
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  28.57%
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  26.03%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  25.81%
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  23.39%
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  19.19%
AS  Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  17.52%
AS  Telephone services, long-distance, Korea  17.15%
AS  Broadband Internet service, Korea  17.14%
AS  Telephone services, international, Korea  17.14%
AS  Telephone services, local, Korea  17.12%
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  15.81%
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  15.19%
EE  Coffee wholesaling, Hungary  15.00%
GLOBAL Vitamin  D  14.77%
WE  Cement I, Germany  13.97%
WE  Steel tubes ("oil country tubes")  11.97%
WE  Cell phones, IT  10.56%
WE  Concrete, Eastern Germany  9.00%
GLOBAL Lysine  7.75%
OC  Transformers, power & distn, E. AU  5.24%
GLOBAL  Construction, Nigeria LNG plants m  3.01%
  
Median of 50  28.57%
Mean of 50  75.10%
  
NO= No. America, WE= Western Europe, AS = Asia, OC = Oceania, EE = Eastern Europe
m) Investigation in progress in 2005 48 
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Table 5. Global Cartel Overcharge Rates, 1990-2005   
Continent Market  Nominal  
dollar ratio
Real 2005  
dollar ratio 
     
GLOBAL Aluminum  Metal  60.00%  127.62% 
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  55.21%  81.04% 
GLOBAL  Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  51.07%  62.55% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  40.90% 41.22% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  36.82% 50.85% 
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f  36.49% 59.16% 
GLOBAL Shipping  (French/African)  35.50%  -- 
GLOBAL  Plastic Additives: Heat Stabilizers
m  34.23%  35.19% 
GLOBAL  Plastic Additives: Impact Modifiers
m   33.97%  34.92% 
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  33.16% 32.85% 
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  31.82% 40.44% 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  31.13% 48.76% 
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  30.77% 39.27% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  30.75% 35.82% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  29.80% 29.12% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  29.19% 31.43% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  28.90% 40.05% 
GLOBAL DRAMs 
m  28.19%  17.40% 
GLOBAL Copper  Concentrate 
m  23.88%  24.07% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  22.90% 32.59% 
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  21.91% 24.82% 
GLOBAL Sorbates  20.07% 38.50% 
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  17.29% 20.80% 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  15.67% 17.20% 
GLOBAL  Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping
m 15.00%  8.89% 
GLOBAL Lysine  13.26% 17.49% 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  12.18% 12.27% 
GLOBAL  Vitamin D   12.08% 13.79% 
GLOBAL  DVD Players, 3C Pool 
m  6.60%  -- 
GLOBAL Methionine  5.11% 5.22% 
GLOBAL Carbon  Black
 m  3.05%  3.05% 
GLOBAL  Construction, Nigeria LNG plants 
m  3.01%  3.01% 
GLOBAL  Diamonds, Industrial   3.00%  2.85% 
GLOBAL  Stamp Auctions (Episode 1)  0.29% 0.75% 
     
Median of 34  28.54% 32.01% 
Mean of 34  25.09% 32.28% 
     
--= no real sales available 




Table 6. Overcharges in the United States, 1990-2005 




Real 2005  
U.S. Dollars 
      
NO Linerboard,  US  11000.0  13033.18 
NO  Flat glass, U.S.  8700.0  10494.57 
GLOBAL DRAMs 
m 4700.0  5549.11 
NO Sulfuric  acid,  US 
m 3300.0  3980.70 
NO  Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 2761.0  2918.60 
NO  High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  1593.0  1959.41 
NO  Corn Glucose Syrup, US  1400.0  1722.02 
GLOBAL Carbon  Fiber  1375.0  2627.70 
NO  Tobacco Leaf, US  1,220.0  1648.82 
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  1025.0  1376.11 
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  642.0  947.16 
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  602.0  888.14 
AS  Vitamin C, US imports from China 
m 411.0  419.39 
GLOBAL Sorbates  400.0  1056.25 
GLOBAL Methionine  365.0  443.50 
GLOBAL Carbon  Black
 m 335.0  360.60 
GLOBAL  Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping
m 300.0  335.18 
GLOBAL  Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  284.0  383.51 
NO  Explosives, commercial, US  280.0  432.87 
NO  Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  274.0  274.10 
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  270.0  398.34 
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  242.0  431.08 
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  222.0  271.36 
NO  Vitamin B4, North America  167.0  273.24 
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 158.0  380.39 
NO  Anti-anxiety drugs, US  150.0  136.49 
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  120.0  160.63 
AF  Construction, USAID in Egypt 
n 100.0  215.49 
GLOBAL Lysine  80.0  97.79 
NO  Polyester staple, US and CA 
m 60.0  63.63 
GLOBAL  Polychloroprene syn. Rubber 
m 58.1  73.89 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  57.0  113.66 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  50.0  60.75 
GLOBAL  Diamonds, Industrial   45.0  132.57 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  41.7  61.52 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  31.7  51.87 
NO  Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  26.0  32.79 
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  25.0  30.38 
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  22.5  30.12 
GLOBAL Methylglucamine  16.5  29.85 
NO Ferrosilicon,  US  16.5  23.08 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  13.0  15.80 
GLOBAL  Vitamin D   9.7  11.19 
WE  Aluminum Phosphide, US  9.5  11.98 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  9.1  11.06 
NO  Moving and storage, Germany-US  5.5  5.50 
GLOBAL  Stamp Auctions (Episode 1)  5.0  18.44 
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  2.6  3.16 
GLOBAL Carbon  Cathode  Block  2.5  3.89 
WE  Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe 0.5  0.58 
      51 
TOTAL (50  observations) 39,977.4 54,001.4 
MEDIAN   150.0 243.4 
MEAN   888.4 1080.0 
      
Source: Spreadsheet dated October 2006 




Table 7. Overcharges in Canada, 1990-2005 




Real 2005  
U.S. Dollars 
      
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  185.00 272.93 
GLOBAL  Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 144.00 149.84 
NO  Iron oxide, Canada  65.00 84.20 
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  51.30 75.68 
GLOBAL Carbon  Black
 m 50.00 52.74 
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  43.00 63.44 
GLOBAL Methionine  39.00 45.03 
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  25.00 37.22 
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  17.00 30.28 
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  13.80 20.36 
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 13.50 30.84 
GLOBAL Sorbates  12.50 36.27 
NO  Vitamin B4, North America  10.60 17.34 
GLOBAL Lysine  8.00 11.91 
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  7.30 9.77 
WE  Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe 3.90 5.22 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  3.60 4.16 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  3.41 5.03 
GLOBAL  Diamonds, Industrial   3.10 3.73 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  2.53 4.14 
NO  Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  1.82 2.30 
NO  Insecticide, BT , CA  1.70 1.70 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  1.27 1.47 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  1.25 2.37 
GLOBAL Methylglucamine  0.90 1.63 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  0.89 1.59 
GLOBAL Carbon  Cathode  Block  0.75 1.17 
GLOBAL  Vitamin D   0.68 0.75 
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  0.45 0.52 
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  0.35 0.62 
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  0.19 0.26 
      
TOTAL (31  observations)  711.8 974.5 
MEDIAN   3.9 5.2 
MEAN   23.0 31.4 
      
Source: Spreadsheet dated October 2006 

















      
WE  Cable, high-voltage, Germany  14256.0 39272.7
WE  Steel, flat stainless  9300.0 11328.2
WE  PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) plastic  5308.0 9268.3
WE Cartonboard  3000.0 4692.5
WE  Waste collection, Germany 
m  2800.0 2913.6
WE Polypropylene  plastic  2417.0 3172.3
WE Steel  beams  2320.0 4114.9
GLOBAL TACA  (Europe/No.Atlantic Shipping)  1800.0 1985.6
WE Petroleum,  Iceland 
m  1625.0 2413.4
WE  Cement I, Germany   1600.0 1744.8
WE British  Sugar  1370.0 3190.4
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  1200.0 2141.6
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  774.0 856.2
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  699.0 1247.5
WE Gasoline,  FR  675.0 712.0
WE Gasoline,  IT  661.0 719.3
WE  Cell phones, IT  655.0 715.8
GLOBAL  Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 576.0 599.4
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  570.0 1128.2
WE Paper,  carbonless  485.0 1232.2
WE Compressed  gases,  NL  357.0 612.8
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  319.0 569.3
WE  Generic drugs, warfarin & penicillin 
m, UK  316.0 344.6
GLOBAL Carbon  Black
 m 305.0 321.7
GLOBAL  Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping
m 300.0 316.5
WE  Steel pipes, insulated heating  242.0 360.3
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  231.0 497.8
GLOBAL  Steel tubes  ("oil country tubes")  225.0 400.8
WE Construction,  Netherlands 
m 193.0 210.9
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  175.0 283.4
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 138.0 351.0
WE Construction,  Norway 
m 130.0 141.5
GLOBAL  Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  122.0 178.9
WE Euro-Zone  banks  112.0 100.6
WE Concrete,  Eastern  Germany  112.0 12.1
GLOBAL Lysine  105.0 191.4
WE  Insurance, industrial property, Germany 
m 100.0 105.5
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  95.0 153.8
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  92.0 164.2
WE  Infant Formula (Episode 1), Italy  75.0 91.8
WE Gasoline,  Sweden  57.0 60.9
WE  Infant Formula (Episode 2), Italy  50.0 52.0
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  49.0 97.0
WE  Danish air routes  49.0 53.2
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  47.0 54.3
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  39.0 43.1
WE  Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe  30.0 54.3
WE  Ferry services, English Channel   24.0 31.9
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  22.0 25.4
WE  Hydro-Electric power equipment, NO  21.1 23.2
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  18.5 39.954 
GLOBAL  Vitamin D   9.3 15.1
WE Zinc  phosphate  8.0 13.0
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  7.7 8.9
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  6.6 7.6
WE  Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, IT  6.5 7.1
WE  Construction, public works, Meuse, France  2.8 3.0
WE  Tobacco processing, Spain   2.6 3.7
WE  Construction, SRO, Netherlands  1.8 3.1
WE Eurocheque  1.6 2.3
WE  Paper, corrugated cardboard, Norway  1.1 1.4
WE  Pharmaceuticals, cholesterol, IT  1.1 1.2
    
TOTAL (62  observations) 56,290.7 99,459.3
MEDIAN   134.0 201.2
MEAN   907.9 1604.2
      
Source: Spreadsheet dated October 2006 
a)  If no country mentioned, the cartel was global or organized across several EU Member States.
m) under investigation 
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Table 9. Overcharges in Other Regions, 1990-2005 
a 




Real 2005  
U.S. Dollars 
      
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  1100.0 2081.3 
EE Cement,  Romania  909.0 957.5 
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  700.7 801.7 
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  660.0 772.8 
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  640.0 1037.5 
GLOBAL  Steel tubes  ("oil country tubes")  638.0 755.5 
AS  Telephone services, local, Korea  567.0 611.0 
GLOBAL  Construction, Nigeria LNG plants 
m 413.0 483.6 
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  359.0 482.0 
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  279.2 374.8 
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  244.3 275.0 
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 226.0 267.6 
AS  Telephone services, long-distance, Korea 137.0 147.6 
GLOBAL  Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 120.0 136.5 
AS  Broadband Internet service, Korea  118.0 127.2 
AS  Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  96.0 116.1 
AS  Philippines telecom, US   95.0 96.9 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  93.1 110.3 
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  77.7 87.5 
AS  Telephone services, international, Korea  73.0 78.7 
GLOBAL Lysine  65.0 96.8 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  41.1 47.0 
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  39.2 46.4 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  34.4 40.7 
OC  Transformers, power & distn, E. AU  27.5 47.2 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  26.4 35.4 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  25.8 30.2 
EE  Coffee wholesaling, Hungary  15.3 13.1 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  12.0 14.2 
GLOBAL  Vitamin D   9.3 10.5 
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  2.1 2.4 
EE  Coffee wholesaling, Czech Republic  0.5 0.4 
    
    
TOTAL (32  observations)  7844.5 10,185.3 
MEDIAN   95.5 113.2 
MEAN   245.1 318.3 
      
Source: Spreadsheet dated October 2006 
a)  Includes Africa, Asia, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
      m) Investigation in progress in 2005 
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Table 10. World-Wide Overcharges, 1990-2005 




Real 2005  
U.S. Dollars 
      
GLOBAL Aluminum  Metal  38400.0 45497.6 
WE  Cable, high-voltage, Germany  14256.0 39272.7 
NO Linerboard,  US  11000.0 13033.2 
WE  Steel, flat stainless  9300.0 11328.2 
NO  Flat glass, U.S.  8700.0 10494.6 
GLOBAL DRAMs 
m 8400.0 5549.1 
GLOBAL  Plastic Additives: Heat Stabilizers 
m 5800.0 6666.7 
WE  PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) plastic  5318.0 9268.3 
GLOBAL  Plastic Additives: Impact Modifiers 
m   4800.0 5517.2 
GLOBAL  Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 3600.0 3804.3 
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  3500.0 5871.9 
NO Sulfuric  acid,  US 
m 3300.0 3980.7 
WE Cartonboard  3000.0 4692.5 
WE  Waste collection, Germany 
m  2800.0 2913.6 
WE Polypropylene  plastic  2417.0 3172.3 
WE Steel  beams  2320.0 4114.9 
GLOBAL Vitamin  Premixes  2128.0 2621.7 
GLOBAL  TACA (Europe/No. Atlantic Shipping)  1800.0 1985.6 
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  1743.0 2740.1 
WE Petroleum,  Iceland 
m 1625.0 4239.2 
WE  Cement I, Germany   1600.0 1744.8 
NO  High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  1593.0 1959.4 
GLOBAL Citric  Acid  1477.0 2209.6 
NO  Corn Glucose Syrup, US  1400.0 1722.0 
GLOBAL Carbon  Fiber  1375.0 2627.7 
WE British  Sugar  1370.0 3190.4 
NO  Tobacco Leaf, US  1220.0 1648.8 
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  1130.0 1996.6 
GLOBAL  Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping 
m 1031.0 651.6 
EE Cement,  Romania  909.0 957.5 
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  882.0 1362.9 
GLOBAL  Steel tubes  ("oil country tubes")  863.0 1156.3 
GLOBAL Copper  Concentrate 
m 825.0 872.1 
GLOBAL Carbon  Black
 m 690.0 735.1 
WE Gasoline,  FR  675.0 712.0 
WE Gasoline,  IT  661.0 719.3 
WE  Cell phones, IT  655.0 715.8 
AS  Telephone services, local, Korea  567.0 611.0 
GLOBAL  Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 535.5 1029.8 
WE Paper,  carbonless  485.0 1232.2 
GLOBAL  Construction, Nigeria LNG plants 
m 413.0 483.6 
GLOBAL Sorbates  412.5 1092.5 
AS  Vitamin C, US imports from China 
m 411.0 419.4 
GLOBAL  Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  406.0 562.4 
GLOBAL Methionine  404.0 488.5 
GLOBAL Beta  Carotene  380.0 541.2 
GLOBAL Canthaxanthin  362.0 459.2 
WE Compressed  gases,  NL  357.0 612.8 
WE  Generic drugs, warfarin & penicillin 
m, UK  316.0 344.6 
NO  Explosives, commercial, US  275.0 432.9 
NO  Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  274.0 274.1 57 
GLOBAL Lysine  258.0 397.9 
WE  Steel pipes, insulated heating  242.0 360.3 
WE Construction,  Netherlands 
m 193.0 210.9 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B12  191.0 226.9 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  178.8 318.3 
NO  Vitamin B4, North America  178.0 290.6 
NO  Anti-anxiety drugs, US  150.0 136.5 
AS  Telephone services, long-distance, Korea  137.0 147.6 
WE Construction,  Norway 
m 130.0 141.5 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  123.0 154.0 
AS  Broadband Internet service, Korea  118.0 127.2 
GLOBAL  Diamonds, Industrial   117.0 136.3 
WE Euro-Zone  banks  112.0 100.6 
WE Concrete,  Eastern  Germany  112.0 12.1 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B2  109.0 183.2 
WE  Insurance, industrial property, Germany 
m 100.5 105.5 
AF  Construction, USAID in Egypt 
n 100.0 215.5 
AS  Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  95.7 116.1 
AS  Philippines telecom, US   95.0 96.9 
GLOBAL  Biotin (Vitamin H)  83.0 117.2 
WE  Infant Formula (Episode 1), Italy  75.0 176.1 
AS  Telephone services, international, Korea  73.0 78.7 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B6  73.0 86.1 
NO  Iron oxide, Canada  65.0 84.2 
NO  Polyester staple, US and CA 
m 60.0 63.6 
NO Compressed  gas,  CA  60.0 76.2 
WE Gasoline,  Sweden  57.0 60.9 
WE  Infant Formula (Episode 2), Italy  50.0 52.0 
GLOBAL Methylglucamine  49.7 31.5 
WE  Danish air routes  46.0 53.2 
WE  Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe  34.4 60.1 
GLOBAL Vitamin  B1  29.0 34.4 
GLOBAL  Vitamin D   29.0 37.5 
NO  Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  27.8 35.1 
OC  Transformers, power & distn, E. AU  27.5 47.2 
WE  Ferry services, English Channel   24.0 31.9 
WE  Hydro-Electric power equipment, NO  21.1 23.2 
NO Ferrosilicon,  US  16.0 23.1 
EE  Coffee wholesaling, Hungary  15.3 13.1 
GLOBAL Carbon  Cathode  Block  13.0 5.1 
GLOBAL  Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  12.8 15.0 
WE  Aluminum Phosphide, US  9.5 12.0 
WE Zinc  phosphate  8.0 13.0 
WE Pharmaceuticals,  respiratory, IT  6.5 7.1 
NO  Moving and storage, Germany-US  5.5 5.5 
GLOBAL  Stamp Auctions (Episode 1)  5.0 18.4 
WE  Construction, public works, Meuse, France 2.8 3.0 
WE Tobacco  processing, Spain   2.6 3.7 
WE  Construction, SRO, Netherlands  1.8 3.1 
NO  Insecticide, BT , CA  1.7 1.7 
WE Eurocheque  1.6 2.3 
WE  Paper, corrugated cardboard, Norway  1.1 1.4 
WE  Pharmaceuticals, cholesterol, IT  1.1 1.2 
EE  Coffee wholesaling, Czech Republic  0.5 0.4 
AS Beer,  Korea  0.1 0.1 
      
      
TOTAL (106  observations)  161,890.3 225,086.8 58 
MEDIAN   217.5 304.4 
MEAN   1527.3 2123.5 
      
TOTAL  (38 observations, global only)    98,285.1 
MEDIAN     607.0 
MEAN     2586.4 
Source: Spreadsheet dated October 2006 




Table 11. International Cartel Recidivists, 1990-2005 
 
Company (other & former names)  HQ 
Number of  
Violations 
    
BASF AG  DE  26 
Total S.A. (TotalFinaElf, Atofina)  FR  18 
Hoffmann La Roche  CH  17 
Akzo Nobel  NL  14 
Aventis (Hoechst, Rhone-Poulenc, Sanofi)  CH  14 
ENI (Ente Nazionale, AGIP, Syndial, Polimeri) IT  14 
Shell (Royal Dutch Shell)  NL  14 
Degussa (Huels)  DE  13 
Bayer AG  DE  11 
Mitsubishi Corp.  JP  10 
Mitsui & Co. Ltd.   JP  10 
    
Exxon Mobil (Esso, Mobil)  US  9 
Holcim CH  9 
Solvay BL  9 
Crompton Corp. (Uniroyal)  US  8 
Stora Enso Ojy                                  FI  8 
Takeda Chemical Industry    JP  8 
ADM US  7 
American Intl. Group (AIG)  US  7 
DuPont US  7 
Hyundai KO  7 
Lafarge FR  7 
Sumitomo (Chemical, Metal)  JP  7 
ABB (Asea Brown Boveri)  CH  6 
International Paper  US  6 
Moller Maersk Group  DK  6 
Abbott Labs    US  5 
BP Amoco  UK  5 
Dow Chemical  US  5 
E. Merck KgaA                                       DE  5 
GrafTech (UCAR, Eastman Chemical)               US  5 
Heidelberg Cement  DE  5 
Interbrew   BL  5 
Kuwait Petroleum  KW  5 
Monsanto US  5 
P&O Ned Lloyd                                     NL/UK  5 
Vodafone (Omnitel, Libertel)  UK  5 
    
Abruzzi Unicem  IT  4 
Ahlstrom FI  4 
Coats Holdings  UK  4 60 
Heijmans NL  4 
ICI (Imperial Chem. Industries)  UK  4 
KT Corp  KO  4 
Nedlloyde Lijnen  NL  4 
Nestlé   CH  4 
Repsol Group  ES  4 
Rio Tinto  UK  4 
Thyssen AG (ThyssenKrupp)  DE  4 
UPM Kymmene (Raflatac)  FI  4 
Ajinomoto JP  3 
Altana Pharma  DE  3 
Barbour Thread Ltd.  UK  3 
Bemis Corporation  US  3 
Celanese US  3 
Cheil Jedang  KO  3 
Chinook Ltd.   CA  3 
Cho Yang                                          KO  3 
ConAgra    US  3 
Daiichi   JP  3 
Danone (BSN)  FR  3 
Deutsche Africa Linie                                DE  3 
DSM NV  NL  3 
Energie Baden-Wuettemberg  DE  3 
Eridania FR/IT  3 
Great Lakes Chemical  US  3 
Hanjin Shipping                                        KO  3 
Hapag Lloyd                                         DE?  3 
Johnson&Johnson US  3 
Kureha Chemical Industry                          JP  3 
Mayr-Meinhof DE  3 
Myllykoski FI  3 
Numico NV  NL  3 
Paperlinx AU  3 
Philip Morris  US  3 
Rohm & Haas                                         US  3 
RWE (Mitgas)  DE  3 
Sappi (S. D. Warren)  ZA  3 
Senator (DSR)  DE  3 
Siemens AG  DE  3 
Skanska AB  SW  3 
Sony JP  3 
Stena Line  SW  3 
Tamoil Libya  3 
Tate & Lyle (A.E. Staley, British Sugar)  UK  3 
    
88 more companies not listed herein  Various 2 
    
TOTAL of 174 recidivists     61 
Source: Spreadsheet dated October 2006 
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Table 12. U.S. Government Cartel Fines, 1990-2005
Market  Real 2005  
dollars 
  
DRAMs m  440.9
Graphite Electrodes  227.5
Vitamin E  131.4
Vitamin Premixes  109.5
Rubber Processing Chemicals m  76.9
Anti-anxiety drugs, US  75.3
Polychloroprene syn. Rubber m  73.1
Vitamin C  72.8
Construction, USAID in Egypt n  55.5
Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping m  52.0
Vitamin A  48.6
Citric Acid  48.5
Lysine 43.2
Sorbates 34.3
Beta Carotene  34.1
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  31.1
Polyester staple, US and CA m  24.4
Polyols, polyester aliphatic, US m  24.4
Construction, marine, US n  22.5
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  18.3
Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  14.9
Nitrile Rubber m  13.6
Vitamin B2  12.7
Sodium Gluconate  11.9
Explosives, commercial, US  11.8
MCAA 10.6
Moving and storage, Germany-US  8.8
Graphite, Isostatic Specialty Products  8.0
MSG 7.1
Transportation, marine, US n  6.8
Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  4.7
Sodium Erythorbate, North Am.  4.5
Maltol, Synthetic, North Am.  4.2
Bromines, US (possible EU)  4.1
Plastic dinnerware, US and CA  4.0
Carbon Electrical Productsm  3.4
Diamonds, Industrial  3.2
Methylglucamine 2.6
Vitamin B4, North America  2.5
Magnetic Iron Oxide (MIO) m  2.3
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) f  2.1
Organic peroxides m  1.8
Carbon Cathode Block  1.2
Tampico Fiber, US  0.9
Canthaxanthin 0.7
Cable-stayed bridges, US n  0.7
Ferrosilicon, US  0.5
California bridge, US n  0.463 
Aluminum Phosphide, US  0.2
Tactile tile, U.S.  0.0
 
Subtotal: 11 vitamins cartels  447.6
Total fines, 50 cases  1794.8
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Table 13. Canadian Government Cartel Fines, 1990-2005





Graphite Electrodes  14.65
Vitamin Premixes  14.20
Vitamin E  8.48
Lysine 5.29
Vitamin C  4.95
Rubber Processing Chemicals 
m 4.64
Vitamin A  4.32
Citric Acid  3.82
Beta Carotene  2.27
Cement, Quebec, Canada  1.88
Compressed gas, CA  1.63
Vitamin B12  1.58
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  1.56
Sorbates 1.29
Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  1.01
Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  0.95
Polyester staple, US and CA 
m 0.91
Insecticide, BT , CA  0.84
Vitamin B2  0.68
Vitamin B4, North America  0.68
Iron pipe, Canada  0.67
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 0.64
Insecticides, Syn. Forest, CA  0.46
Sodium Erythorbate, North Am.  0.43
Sodium Gluconate  0.37
Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe  0.36
Carbon Cathode Block  0.30





Subtotal of 12 vitamins  40.70
Total of 31 cases  104.65
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 




Table 14. European Union Cartel Fines, 1990-2005




DRAMs m  160.34
TACA (Europe/No.Atlantic Shipping)  137.94
Copper tubes, plumbing  120.44
Graphite Electrodes  93.04
Paper, carbonless  86.09
Vitamin E  83.60
Euro-Zone banks  71.01
Rubber Processing Chemicals m  59.28
Vitamin A  54.33
Citric Acid  50.45
Methionine 48.31
Sewing needles  46.94
Beer, Belgian, HORECA channel  46.87
Lysine 46.71
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  45.96
Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe  44.68
Tobacco, leaf ("raw"), procurement, IT  44.22
Copper tubes, industrial  42.19
Beta Carotene  41.44
Steel tubes ("oil country tubes")  40.50
Canthaxanthin 40.16
Vitamin C  40.11
Sorbates 37.84
Cartonboard 33.87
Steel pipes, insulated heating  33.27
Danish air routes  32.91
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) f  32.90
Cement , white & gray  29.47
Steel beams  29.31
Graphite, Isostatic Specialty Products  28.09
Vitamin B2  25.90
Thread, industrial, Benelux and Nordic  21.37
Carbon Electrical Productsm  21.07
Vitamin D  19.41
Sodium Gluconate  17.01
British Sugar  16.54
Tobacco processing, Spain  16.51
Organic peroxides m  14.63
Steel, flat stainless  12.23
Compressed gases, NL  11.76
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  11.37
MSG 9.83
Polypropylene plastic  9.43
Nucleotides (Nucleic Acid)  7.45
Construction, SRO, Netherlands  6.42
Zinc phosphate  6.12
Shipping CEWAL (N. Eur-W. Africa)  4.4866 
Graphite, Extruded  4.10
Shipping (Europe/Cent. W. Africa)  4.04
Ferry services, Adriatic  3.79
Thread, automotive  3.66
Shipping (French/African)  3.50
PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) plastic  3.45
Shipping (Europe/Far East)  3.00
Construction, mobile crane rental, NL  2.53
Eurocheque 2.07
Electrical equipment distribution, NL  1.71
Beer, France, HORECA f  1.52
Methylglucamine 1.45
Beer, Belgian, Retail Private Label  1.10
Ferry services, English Channel  0.26
Beer, Luxembourg, HORECA  0.14
 
 
Subtotal of 11 vitamins  468.639
Total fines, 63 cases  2215.69
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 




Table 15. Other Jurisdictions’ Cartel Fines, 1990-2005 
Location of  
Cartel 
Market  Real 2005  
US dollars 
    
GLOBAL  Insurance brokers, commercial, US m  992.39 
DE  Cement I, Germany  495.11 
NL  Construction, Netherlands m  260.66 
IT Gasoline,  IT  168.42 
DE  Insurance, industrial property, Germany m  134.56 
DE  Concrete, Eastern Germany  115.22 
SW  Asphalt, Sweden m  106.47 
KO  Telephone services, local, Korea  101.80 
KO  Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  101.33 
NL  Mobile phone operators in NL  82.44 
FI  Asphalt paving, Finland  80.69 
IT  Cell phones, IT  58.52 
KZ  Petoleum products, Kazakhstan m  51.41 
BR  Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil  47.46 
SW Bitumen,  Sweden  46.82 
KO Excavators  manufacturing,  Korea  43.60 
IT Cigarettes,  Italy  35.10 
UK  Toys and games, UK  33.97 
RU Cement,  Romania  31.40 
FR  Construction, public works, Meuse, France  26.60 
FR Gasoline,  FR  24.57 
KO  Forklift manufcturing, Korea  24.52 
KO Cement,  Korea  20.10 
IT  Diabetes testing devices, IT  19.80 
KO  Telephone services, long-distance, Korea  18.56 
AR  Cement, Argentina m  17.87 
FR Beef,  France  17.52 
PT  Diabetes testing devices, Portugal  16.88 
SW Gasoline,  Sweden  12.70 
JP  Petroleum, Military fuel, JP  10.84 
IT  Glass (food) containers, IT  10.72 
CZ  Gasoline, Czech Republic  9.25 
FR  Ball & roller bearings, FR  8.88 
AU  Transformers, power & distn, E. AU  6.47 
NL Prawns,  Netherlands  6.11 
IT  Insurance, non-life, Italy  5.24 
KO  Broadband Internet service, Korea  5.07 
UK  Generic drugs, warfarin & penicillin m, UK  4.73 
KO  Telephone services, international, Korea  4.34 
GLOBAL Graphite  Electrodes  4.02 
IT  Gas water heaters, IT  3.95 
ES Gasoline,  Spain  2.98 
GLOBAL Vitamin  E  2.87 
GLOBAL Vitamin  A  2.77 
NL  Construction of athletic tracks, NL  2.62 
IT  Radiological media, IT  2.29 
GLOBAL Vitamin  C  2.21 68 
IT  Infant Formula (Episode 1), Italy  1.92 
HU  Coffee wholesaling, Hungary  1.81 
DE  Cable, high-voltage, Germany  1.72 
KO  Batteries manufacturing, auto, Korea  1.53 
NO  Hydro-Electric power equipment, NO  1.42 
JP  Vinyl food wrap, Japan  1.27 
IT  Auditing services, IT  1.07 
IL  Digital switches, Israel  0.91 
NL Gasoline,  NL  0.85 
KO Beer,  Korea  0.67 
NO  Paper, corrugated cardboard, Norway  0.60 
HU Cement,  Hungary  0.41 
IT Diesel  Fuel,  IT  0.31 
CZ  Coffee wholesaling, Czech Republic  0.27 
AU Compressors,  Australia  0.27 
IT  Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, IT  0.23 
NL  Special concrete foundations design, NL  0.11 
GLOBAL Lysine  0.09 
GLOBAL  Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  0.05 
IT Pharmaceuticals,  cholesterol,  IT  0.04 
MX  Gas, liquid propane (LPG), Toluca, Mex.  0.02 
GLOBAL  Insurance brokers, commercial, US m  992.39 
Subtotal of 7 vitamins fines KO+AU   7.91 
Total of 68 cases  3297.40 
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 




Table 16. Private Cartel Settlements, 1990-2005 




    
Tobacco Leaf, US  1252.32  
Vitamin E  509.73  
High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  492.49  
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  401.11  
Graphite Electrodes  371.37  
Vitamin Premixes  348.57  
Methionine 234.68  
Vitamin A  232.89  
Cosmetics, "prestige," U.S.  229.38  
Vitamin C  218.66  
Citric Acid  209.50  
Linerboard, US  198.83  
Digital switches, Israel  188.90  
Diamonds, gem  181.00  
Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  164.13  
Beta Carotene  118.91  
Vitamin B4, North America  103.56  
Lysine 86.81  
Anti-anxiety drugs, US  85.30  
MSG 72.58  
Automotive Refinishing Paint m  63.71  
Explosives, commercial, US  59.18  
Sorbates 54.85  
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  50.89  
EPDM, Synthetic Rubber m  50.69  
Polyester staple, US and CA m  47.16  
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) f  43.03  
MCC (microcrystalline cellulose)  42.75  
Biotin (Vitamin H)  42.15  
Construction, USAID in Egypt n  38.82  
Vitamin B2  38.00  
Flat glass, U.S.  36.66  
Glass containers, U.S.  30.94  
Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  30.75  
Carbon Fiber  23.48  
Polychloroprene syn. Rubber m  19.96  
Vitamin B1  14.49  
Rubber Processing Chemicals m  13.57  
Vitamin B6  13.39  
Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  11.14  
Magnetic audio tape, US  6.61  
Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  6.59  
MCAA 6.44  
Sodium Erythorbate, North Am.  5.85  
Diamonds, Industrial  5.78  
Maltol, Synthetic, North Am.  5.51  
Bromines, US (possible EU)  5.30  
Vitamin B12  3.07  70 
Organic peroxides m  2.64  
Canthaxanthin 2.63  
Tampico Fiber, US  0.97  
Transportation, diamonds, intl., Israel  0.52  
Sodium Gluconate  0.35  
Aluminum Phosphide, US  0.20  
Stamp Auctions (Episode 1)  0.17  
  
Subtotal of 16 vitamins US&CA  1777.31  
Total of 55 cases  6478.96  
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006   
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Table 17. Total Monetary Corporate Antitrust Sanctions, 1990-2005 




    
Tobacco Leaf, US  1162.28 1753.00 
Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 992.39 1129.00 
Vitamin E  923.80 1962.00 
Vitamin Premixes  708.46 1502.10 
Graphite Electrodes  631.18 1305.45 
DRAMs 
m 601.29 750.00 
Cement I, Germany   495.11 798.00 
Vitamin A  428.83 912.50 
Vitamin C  418.97 1071.60 
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses)  357.87 624.95 
Construction, Netherlands 
m 260.66 401.00 
Plasterboard 245.58 478.30 
Beta Carotene  240.49 463.60 
High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  239.15 611.00 
Methionine 218.24 555.20 
Citric Acid  215.13 480.59 
Digital switches, Israel  189.80 390.83 
Diamonds, gem  181.00 250.00 
Gasoline, IT  168.42 290.00 
Rubber Processing Chemicals 
m 153.43 233.20 
Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  152.33 190.00 
TACA (Europe/No.Atlantic Shipping)  137.94 235.90 
Lysine 137.43 307.95 
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  135.77 291.50 
Cosmetics, “prestige,” U.S.  135.68 199.00 
Insurance, industrial property, Germany 
m 134.56 171.20 
Anti-anxiety drugs, US  125.78 174.00 
Copper tubes, plumbing  120.44 268.00 
Linerboard, US  117.61 254.50 
Concrete, Eastern Germany  115.22 192.60 
Asphalt, Sweden 
m 106.47 189.30 
Sorbates 105.84 424.36 
Telephone services, local, Korea  101.80 109.70 
Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  101.33 146.30 
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 95.06 249.50 
Polychloroprene syn. Rubber 
m 93.06 118.40 
Vitamin B2  91.11 214.80 
Paper, carbonless  86.09 282.60 
Mobile phone operators in NL  82.43 92.06 
Asphalt paving, Finland  80.69 121.70 
Construction, USAID in Egypt 
n 78.44 201.23 
MSG 77.45 164.00 
Polyester staple, US and CA 
m 72.52 89.62 
Euro-Zone banks  71.01 89.70 
Vitamin B4, North America  64.42 154.00 
Cell phones, IT  58.52 80.70 
Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  57.80 121.75 
Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping
m 52.01 62.58 
Petoleum products, Kazakhstan 
m 51.41 55.40 
EPDM, Synthetic Rubber
m 50.69 70.00 
Biotin (Vitamin H)  49.37 128.00 
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil  47.45 88.50 72 
Sewing needles  46.94 77.80 
Beer, Belgian, HORECA channel  46.87 91.50 
Bitumen, Sweden  46.82 58.40 
Canthaxanthin 45.50 88.70 
Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe  45.04 89.05 
Tobacco, leaf (“raw”), procurement, IT  44.22 68.03 
Excavators manufacturing, Korea  43.60 49.60 
MCC (microcrystalline cellulose)  42.75 150.00 
Copper tubes, industrial  42.19 92.00 
Steel tubes  (“oil country tubes”)  40.50 101.50 
Explosives, commercial, US  37.87 112.14 
Automotive Refinishing Paint 
m 37.68 67.00 
Graphite, Isostatic Specialty Products  36.32 83.46 
Cigarettes, Italy  35.10 62.40 
Toys and games, UK  33.97 43.70 
Cartonboard 33.87 117.20 
Steel pipes, insulated heating  33.27 76.80 
Danish air routes  32.91 43.10 
Cement, Romania  31.40 35.90 
Sodium Gluconate  29.58 85.97 
Cement , white & gray    29.47 102.00 
Steel beams  29.31 115.00 
Construction, public works, Meuse, France  26.60 49.60 
Flat glass, U.S.  26.55 61.70 
Paper, Canada 
m 25.31 32.20 
Gasoline, FR  24.57 29.80 
Carbon Electrical Products
m 24.56 142.10 
Forklift Manufacturing, Korea  24.52 27.90 
Polyols, polyester aliphatic, US 
m  24.37 33.00 
Construction, marine, US 
n 22.51 49.30 
Carbon Fiber  21.79 44.00 
Thread, industrial, Benelux and Nordic  21.37 44.01 
Vitamin B6  20.64 53.50 
Cement, Korea  20.10 21.80 
Vitamin B1  20.06 52.00 
Diabetes testing devices, IT  19.80 35.20 
Vitamin D   19.41 37.90 
Organic peroxides 
m 19.07 111.18 
Telephone services, long-distance, Korea  18.56 20.00 
Cement, Argentina 
m 17.87 108.30 
Beef, France  17.52 19.00 
Diabetes testing devices, Portugal  16.88 19.20 
British Sugar  16.54 59.70 
Tobacco processing, Spain   16.51 24.90 
MCAA 15.70 43.12 
Nitrile Rubber 
m 13.63 15.20 
Gasoline, Sweden  12.70 16.20 
Steel, flat stainless  12.23 23.10 
Compressed gases, NL  11.76 22.90 
Paper, thermal fax, US and CA  11.65 31.45 
Petroleum, Military fuel, JP  10.84 18.12 
Glass (food) containers, IT  10.72 21.60 
Polypropylene plastic  9.43 59.30 
Gasoline, Czech Republic  9.25 10.33 
Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  9.06 23.50 
Bromines, US (possible EU)  9.04 16.00 
Ball & roller bearings, FR  8.88 18.77 
Moving and storage, Germany-US  8.83 9.50 73 
Maltol, Synthetic, North Am.  8.49 21.15 
Sodium Erythorbate, North Am.  8.41 19.30 
Nucleotides (Nucleic Acid)  7.45 16.00 
Transportation, marine, US 
n 6.79 16.20 
Diamonds, Industrial   6.63 20.35 
Transformers, power & distn, E. AU  6.47 12.40 
Construction, SRO, Netherlands  6.42 27.30 
Zinc phosphate  6.12 11.95 
Prawns, Netherlands  6.11 8.05 
Vitamin B12  5.82 14.80 
Magnetic audio tape, US  5.51 11.65 
Insurance, non-life, Italy  5.24 13.20 
Glass containers, U.S.  5.11 72.00 
Broadband Internet service, Korea  5.07 5.46 
Generic drugs, warfarin & penicillin 
m, UK  4.73 8.00 
Shipping CEWAL (N. Eur-W. Africa)  4.48 12.10 
Telephone services, international, Korea  4.34 4.68 
Methylglucamine 4.19 8.17 
Graphite, Extruded  4.10 8.80 
Shipping (Europe/Cent. W. Africa)  4.04 26.80 
Plastic dinnerware, US and CA  4.02 9.14 
Gas water heaters, IT  3.95 7.29 
Ferry services, Adriatic  3.78 11.00 
Thread, automotive  3.66 9.21 
Shipping (French/African)  3.50 20.24 
PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) plastic  3.45 20.00 
Shipping (Europe/Far East)  3.00 7.70 
Gasoline, Spain  2.98 3.56 
Construction of athletic tracks, NL  2.62 3.37 
Construction, mobile crane rental, NL  2.53 11.80 
Magnetic Iron Oxide (MIO) 
m 2.33 5.00 
Radiological media, IT  2.29 3.94 
Eurocheque 2.07 7.80 
Infant Formula (Episode 1), Italy  1.92 2.99 
Cement, Quebec, Canada  1.88 4.10 
Coffee wholesaling, Hungary  1.81 3.50 
Cable, high-voltage, Germany  1.72 153.10 
Electrical equipment distribution, NL  1.71 6.90 
Compressed gas, CA  1.63 4.58 
Batteries manufacturing, auto, Korea  1.53 1.62 
Beer, France, HORECA 
f 1.52 3.07 
Carbon Cathode Block  1.52 2.60 
Tampico Fiber, US  1.50 3.70 
Hydro-Electric power equipment, NO  1.42 2.62 
Vinyl food wrap, Japan  1.27 3.36 
Beer, Belgian, Retail Private Label  1.10 1.60 
Auditing services, IT  1.07 2.24 
Gasoline, NL  0.85 1.09 
Insecticide, BT , CA  0.84 1.90 
Cable-stayed bridges, US 
n 0.70 1.32 
Beer, Korea  0.67 0.93 
Iron pipe, Canada  0.67 1.80 
Paper, corrugated cardboard, Norway  0.60 1.67 
Ferrosilicon, US  0.48 1.28 
Insecticides, Syn. Forest, CA  0.46 2.10 
California bridge, US 
n 0.42 0.79 
Cement, Hungary  0.41 0.48 
Diesel Fuel, IT  0.31 0.52 74 
Transportation, diamonds, intl., Israel  0.31 0.50 
Aluminum Phosphide, US  0.30 0.80 
Coffee wholesaling, Czech Republic  0.27 0.52 
Compressors, Australia  0.27 0.49 
Ferry services, English Channel   0.26 0.65 
Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, IT  0.23 0.39 
Stamp Auctions (Episode 1)  0.16 0.68 
Beer, Luxembourg, HORECA  0.14 0.40 
Special concrete foundations design, NL  0.11 0.12 
Pharmaceuticals, cholesterol, IT  0.04 0.07 
Tactile tile, U.S.  0.04 0.05 
Gas, liquid propane (LPG), Toluca, Mex.  0.02 0.04 
   
Subtotal of 18 vitamins (US, CA, KO & AU)  3,379.6 7,430.8 
Total of 180 cases with real available  13,469.7 25,390.7 
   
Infant formula, IT  -- 11.83 
Concrete, ready-mix, Italy (Lombardy)  -- 49.10 
Distribution, electrical appliances, FR  -- 33.60 
Elevator repairs, IT  -- 8.42 
Pharmaceuticals, obesity, IT  -- 1.62 
Recorded music, IT  -- 4.47 
Total of 185 cases, 6 with real not available  25,499.7 
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 




Table 18. Penalties by Geographic Location of Cartel 
Location of  
Collusion: 
Penalty Source 




   Real 2005  
million US 
dollar 
%  Real 2005 
 million US 
dollar 
%  Real 2005 
 million US 
dollar 
% 
           
 Africa: US DOJ 
a  2 22.96 0.4% 55.48 0.8% 78.44 0.6%
     
          
 Asia:  20 189.21 3.1% 334.55 4.6% 523.76 3.9%
China 1  0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Israel 2  189.21 3.1% 0.91 0.0% 190.11 1.4%
Japan 6  0 0.0% 12.11 0.2% 12.11 0.1%
Korea 10  0 0.0% 321.53 4.4% 321.53 2.4%
US DOJ 
d 1  0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
     
 Eastern  
Europe: 
7 0 0.0% 94.54 1.3% 94.54 0.7%
Czech Republic  2  0 0.0% 9.52 0.1% 9.52 0.1%
Hungary 2  0 0.0% 2.21 0.0% 2.21 0.0%
Kazakhstan 1 0 0.0% 51.41 -- 51.41 0.4%
Lithuania 1  0 0.0% 0 --  0 0.0%
Rumania 1  0 0.0% 31.4 0.4% 31.4 0.2%
      
EU-Wide: EC  55 0 0.0% 961.18 13.1% 961.18 7.1%
     
Global:  73  3796.40 62.7% 3801.65 51.9% 7598.09 56.4%
US DOJ  30 -- -- 1538.48 21.0% 1538.48 11.4%
Private US&CA  18  3796.40 62.7% -- -- 3796.40 28.2%
CA CBC  20 -- -- 70.53 1.0% 70.53 0.5%
EU  31 -- -- 1188.24 16.2% 1188.24 8.8%
Other National
   6 -- -- 12.02 0.2% 12.02 0.1%
US States  1 0? 0.0% 992.39 12.6% 992.39 7.4%
     
 Latin  
America: 
9 0 0.0% 65.35 0.9% 65.35 0.5%
Argentina 2  0 0.0% 17.87 0.2% 17.87 0.1%
Brazil 5  0 0.0% 47.45 0.6% 47.45 0.4%
Chile 1  0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Mexico 1  0 0.0% 0.02 0.0% 0.02 0.0%
     
North  
America: 
46 2048.53 33.8% 234.61 3.2% 2283.14 17.0%
Canada 7  0 0.0% 30.79 0.4% 30.79 0.2%
North America  7  75.02 1.2% 21.98 0.3% 97 0.7%
United States  32  1973.51 32.6% 181.84 2.5% 2155.35 16.0%
     
 Oceania:  4 0 0.0% 6.73 0.1% 6.73 0.0%
Australia  3 0 0.0% 6.73 0.1% 6.73 0.0%
New Zealand  1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
     76 
 W. European 
Nations: 
67 0 0.0% 1858.45 25.4% 1858.45 13.8%
Finland 1  0 0.0% 80.69 1.1% 80.69 0.6%
France 8  0 0.0% 77.56 1.1% 77.56 0.6%
Germany 8  0 0.0% 746.62 10.2% 746.62 5.5%
Iceland 1  0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Italy 24  0 0.0% 351.82 4.8% 351.82 2.6%
Netherlands 13  0 0.0% 375.2 5.1% 375.2 2.8%
Norway 3  0 0.0% 2.02 0.0% 2.02 0.0%
Portugal 1  0 0.0% 16.88 0.2% 16.88 0.1%
Spain 1  0 0.0% 2.98 0.0% 2.98 0.0%
Sweden 3  0 0.0% 165.99 2.3% 165.99 1.2%
United Kingdom  4  0 0.0% 38.7 0.5% 38.7 0.3%
     
     
TOTAL   180 6057.14 100.0% 7318.0 100.0% 13,469.68 100.0%
            
a)  Includes one US DOJ prosecution of a cartel operating in Egypt.  The settlement amount is 
federal government restitution. 
b)  Included in cell above 
c)  The only private settlement amounts outside North America are two in Israel and one in Australia. 






Table 19. Real Sanctions Relative to Affected Sales 
Cartel Market  US CA  EU  Other 
Govt. 
Private Total 
  % %  % %  %  % 
Anti-anxiety drugs, US 1102.2  --  --  --  738.31  1840.5
Construction, public works, Meuse, FR  --  --  1333.8 354.8  --  1688.6
Concrete, Eastern Germany  --  --  0.00  85.32  --  85.32
Paper, Canada 
m --  61.07 --  --  --  61.07
Polyols, polyester aliphatic, US 
m  57.66  --  --  --  0.00  57.66
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses) 4.87  --  4.37  0.00  49.35  39.80
Tobacco processing, Spain   --  --  35.38  0.00  --  35.38
Moving and storage, Germany-US  30.36  --  --  --  0.00  30.36
Euro-Zone banks  --  --  29.67  0.00  --  29.67
Insecticide, BT , CA  --  26.67 --  --  --  26.67
Eurocheque --  --  22.01  0.00  --  22.01
Construction, USAID in Egypt 
n 15.22  --  --  --  6.30  21.52
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  8.42  11.93 13.49  0.01  32.04  20.76
Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  64.87  19.96
Digital switches, Israel  --  --  --  0.09  --  19.66
Beta Carotene  7.53  8.19  6.60  0.00  35.99  18.03
Vitamin E  6.69  6.45  3.47  0.09  35.50  17.08
Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  --  --  --  16.58  --  16.58
Vitamin B2  7.61  5.11  9.73  0.00  31.16  16.42
Vitamin A  4.98  6.28  3.23  0.11  32.65  12.36
Tampico Fiber, US  7.62  --  --  --  4.72  12.35
Construction, Netherlands 
m --  --  0.00  10.88  --  10.88
Diabetes testing devices, IT  --  --  --  10.24  --  10.24
Vitamin C  5.83  5.65  3.01  0.07  23.96  9.65
Zinc phosphate  --  --  9.28  0.00  --  9.28
Sodium Erythorbate, North Am.  5.56  4.43  --  --  4.25  9.24
Tobacco, leaf ("raw"), procurement, IT  --  --  8.99  0.00  --  8.99
Insurance, industrial property, DE 
m --  --  0.00  8.90  --  8.90
Graphite Electrodes  10.97  3.80  3.50  0.08  14.08  8.71
Biotin (Vitamin H)  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  28.22  8.67
Vitamin Premixes  4.53  6.89  0.00  0.00  24.19  8.51
Vitamin B4, North America  0.34  1.48  --  --  8.46  8.37
MCC (microcrystalline cellulose) 0.00  --  --  --  7.51  7.51
Vitamin D   0.00  0.00  18.03  0.00  0.00  7.20
Vitamin B1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  33.01  7.15
Vitamin B6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  31.45  7.11
Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  0.00  --  --  --  6.86  6.86
Tobacco Leaf, US  0.00  --  --  --  6.55  6.55
Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  4.70  10.64 0.00  0.00  13.25  6.42
Sodium Gluconate  7.66  2.44 11.06  0.00  0.18  6.04
Lysine 7.87  9.54  6.79  0.01  7.68  6.04
Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) Europe 0.00  0.72  11.99  0.00  0.00  5.87
Methylglucamine 10.11  12.61 5.75  0.00  0.00  5.63
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 0.37  1.31  6.98  0.00  10.45  5.46
Polychloroprene syn. Rubber 
m 13.34  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.64  4.37
Cement I, Germany   --  --  0.00  3.97  --  3.97
Citric Acid  3.31  4.22  3.70  0.00  7.66  3.82
Sorbates 2.44  3.07  5.16  0.00  2.31  3.73
Insecticides, Syn. Forest, CA  --  3.72  --  --  --  3.72
Generic drugs, warfarin & penicillin 
m, UK  --  --  0.00  3.65  --  3.65
Paper, thermal fax, US and CA 1.46  4.17  --  --  1.85  3.36
Nucleotides (Nucleic Acid)  0.00  0.00  9.63  0.00  0.00  3.2578 
Telephone services, local, Korea  --  --  --  3.01  --  3.01
Plastic dinnerware, US and CA  3.31  0.00  --  --  0.00  3.01
Danish air routes  --  --  3.00  0.00  --  3.00
Plasterboard --  --  2.98  0.00  --  2.98
Nitrile Rubber 
m 5.37  --  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.95
Radiological media, IT  --  --  0.00  2.92  --  2.92
Asphalt paving, Finland  --  --  0.00  2.73  --  2.73
Maltol, Synthetic, North Am. 1.37  0.00  --  --  1.43  2.54
Steel pipes, insulated heating  --  --  2.50  0.00  --  2.50
Canthaxanthin 0.54  0.00 7.46  0.00  3.45  2.45
Graphite, Isostatic Specialty Products  1.64  0.52  6.01  0.00  0.00  2.43
Cement, Romania  --  --  --  2.41  --  2.41
Paper, carbonless  --  --  2.40  0.00  --  2.40
Prawns, Netherlands  --  --  0.00  2.38  --  2.38
Infant Formula (Episode 1), Italy  --  --  0.00  2.34  --  2.34
Methionine 0.00  0.00  1.31  0.00  4.99  2.33
Telephone services, long-distance, KO  --  --  --  2.28  --  2.28
Construction, marine, US 
n 17.44  --  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.94
DRAMs 
m 2.47  0.00  3.80  0.00  0.00  1.89
Asphalt, Sweden 
m --  --  --  1.76  --  1.76
Gasoline, Sweden  --  --  0.00  1.74  --  1.74
Excavators manufacturing, Korea  --  --  --  1.73  --  1.73
Rubber Processing Chemicals 
m 2.50  1.99  4.80  0.00  0.41  1.72
Pharmaceuticals, cholesterol, IT  --  --  0.00  1.70  --  1.70
Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, IT  --  --  0.00  1.65  --  1.65
High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  0.00  --  --  --  1.59  1.59
Coffee wholesaling, Hungary  --  --  --  1.55  --  1.55
Copper tubes, industrial  --  --  1.53  0.00  --  1.53
Sewing needles  --  --  1.50  0.00  --  1.50
Forklift manufacturing, Korea  --  --  --  1.37  --  1.37
Glass (food) containers, IT  --  --  0.00  1.35  --  1.35
Beer, Belgian, Retail Private Label  --  --  1.34  0.00  --  1.34
Bromines, US (possible EU)  0.60  --  --  --  0.71  1.31
Carbon Cathode Block  5.32  4.32 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.31
Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 0.00  0.00  0.00  6.57  0.00  1.26
Gas water heaters, IT  --  --  0.00  1.23  --  1.23
Aluminum Phosphide, US  0.76  --  --  --  0.44  1.19
Compressed gases, NL  --  --  1.13  0.00  --  1.13
Transformers, power & distn., E. AU  --  --  --  1.09  --  1.09
Vitamin B12  0.00  64.98 0.00  0.00  3.12  1.05
Telephone services, international, Korea  --  --  --  0.999  --  0.999
Cell phones, IT  --  --  0.00  0.863  --  0.863
Gasoline, FR  --  --  0.00  0.863  --  0.863
Beer, Belgian, HORECA channel  --  --  0.85  0.000  --  0.853
Gasoline, IT  --  --  0.00  0.830  --  0.830
Cement, Korea  --  --  --  0.760  --  0.760
Broadband Internet service, Korea  --  --  --  0.721  --  0.721
Parcel Tankers, Chemical Shipping 
m 2.42  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.710
Copper tubes, plumbing  --  --  0.69  0.000  --  0.689
MCAA 5.96  --  0.00  0.000  2.84  0.672
Petroleum, Military fuel, JP  --  --  --  0.669  --  0.669
Compressed gas, CA  --  0.64  --  --  --  0.640
Cigarettes, Italy  --  --  --  0.571  --  0.571
Graphite, Extruded  0.00  --  1.74  0.000  0.00  0.543
Hydro-Electric power equipment, NO  --  --  0.00  0.536  --  0.536
EPDM, Synthetic Rubber 
m 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.000  1.35  0.506
Pharmaceuticals, generic, Brazil  --  --  --  0.490  --  0.490
Steel tubes  ("oil country tubes") --  --  1.88  0.000  --  0.47879 
Carbon Electrical Products 
m 6.64  2.09  0.41  0.000  0.00  0.474
British Sugar  --  --  0.47  0.000  --  0.465
Linerboard, US  0.00  --  --  --  0.45  0.451
Explosives, commercial, US  0.13  --  --  --  0.29  0.426
MSG 0.15  0.00  0.30  0.000  1.28  0.395
Cement, Argentina 
m --  --  --  0.344  --  0.344
Beef, France  --  --  0.00  0.337  --  0.337
Magnetic Iron Oxide (MIO) 
m 0.98  --  0.00  0.000  0.00  0.271
Ferrosilicon, US  0.25  --  --  --  0.00  0.248
Steel beams  --  --  0.24  0.000  --  0.237
Gasoline, Czech Republic  --  --  0.00  0.230  --  0.230
Cartonboard --  --  0.21  0.000  --  0.208
Cosmetics, "prestige," U.S. 0.00  --  --  --  0.20  0.204
Automotive Refinishing Paint 
m 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.44  0.171
Diamonds, Industrial   0.17  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.18  0.139
Polypropylene plastic  --  --  0.11  0.000  --  0.114
Insurance, non-life, Italy  --  --  0.00  0.114  --  0.114
Carbon Fiber  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.000  0.34  0.106
Ferry services, English Channel   --  --  0.09  0.000  --  0.094
Ferry services, Adriatic  --  --  0.09  0.000  --  0.093
Beer, Luxembourg, HORECA --  --  0.08  0.000  --  0.077
Flat glass, U.S.  0.00 --  --  --  0.08  0.076
Steel, flat stainless --  --  0.07  0.000  --  0.072
Cement , white & gray    --  --  0.07  0.000  --  0.070
Organic peroxides 
m 0.16  0.00  0.19  0.000  0.24  0.069
Construction, mobile crane rental, NL  --  --  0.06  0.000  --  0.063
PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) plastic  --  --  0.02  0.000  --  0.025
Electrical equipment distribution, NL  --  --  0.01  0.000  --  0.0144
Glass containers, U.S. 0.00  --  --  --  0.01  0.0088
Construction, SRO, Netherlands  --  --  0.01  0.000  --  0.0082
Stamp Auctions (Episode 1)  0.00  --  --  --  0.01  0.0064
Cable, high-voltage, Germany --  --  0.00  0.0021  --  0.0021
           
Median 4.87 4.38 2.99 1.37 4.49  1.82
Mean 30.89 9.82 28.80 9.37 25.81  30.97
Number (372 total)  45 28 56 53 49  142
         
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 




Table 20. Real Sanctions Relative to Overcharges 





  % %  %  %  %  % 
Construction, public works, Meuse, 
France  -- -- 0.00 885.58 --  885.58
Moving and storage, Germany-US  160.57 -- -- --  0.00  160.57
Insurance, industrial property, DE 
m -- -- 0.00 127.57  --  127.57
Polychloroprene syn. Rubber 
m 98.92 -- -- --  27.02  125.94
Construction, Netherlands 
m -- -- 0.00 123.58  --  123.58
Polyester staple, US and CA 
m 38.42 -- -- --  74.11  113.96
Anti-anxiety drugs, US 55.18 -- -- --  36.96  92.15
Concrete, Eastern Germany  -- -- -- --  --  89.50
Petroleum, Military fuels, Korea  -- -- -- 87.26  --  87.26
Tobacco Leaf, US  0.00 -- -- --  70.49  70.49
Folic Acid (Vitamin B9)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  286.93  60.44
Coffee wholesaling, Czech Republic -- -- -- 60.24  --  60.24
Vitamin B1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  181.40  58.32
Cardizem CD hypertension drug, US  0.00 -- -- --  55.57  55.57
Insecticide, BT , CA  -- 49.55 -- --  --  49.55
Methionine 0.00 0.00 -- --  38.32  44.67
Paper, corrugated cardboard, 
Norway  -- -- 0.00 43.77 --  43.77
Vitamin B3 (Niacin)  24.18 42.66 0.00 0.00  68.13  37.53
Construction, USAID in Egypt 
n 25.75 -- -- --  10.66  36.40
Paper, thermal fax, US and CA 14.44 41.22 -- --  18.22  33.22
Carbon Cathode Block  31.44 25.58 -- --  0.00  30.09
Cement I, Germany   -- -- 0.00 28.38  --  28.38
Vitamin Premixes  12.33 18.76 0.00 0.00  65.84  27.02
Insurance brokers, commercial, US 
m 0.00 0.00 0.00 134.86  0.00 26.09
Vitamin B6  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  130.64  23.97
Gasoline, IT  -- -- 0.00 23.42  --  23.42
Vitamin B4, North America  0.91 3.91 -- --  22.42  22.17
Gasoline, Sweden  -- -- 0.00 20.86  --  20.86
Infant Formula (Episode 2), Italy  -- -- 0.00 19.99  --  19.99
Tobacco processing, Spain   -- -- 19.68 0.00  --  19.68
Telephone services, local, Korea  -- -- -- 16.66  --  16.66
Coffee wholesaling, Hungary  -- -- -- 13.78  --  13.78
Transformers, power & distn, E. AU  -- -- -- 13.69  --  13.69
Methylglucamine 8.60 10.72 -- --  0.00  13.32
Telephone services, long-distance, 
Korea  -- -- -- 12.57 --  12.57
High Fructose Corn Syrup, US  0.00 -- -- --  12.21  12.21
DRAMs 
m 7.95 -- -- --  0.00  10.84
Sorbates 3.24 3.56 -- --  3.07  9.69
Explosives, commercial, US  2.72 -- -- --  6.02  8.75
Cell phones, IT  -- -- 0.00 8.18  --  8.18
Parcel Tankers, Chem. Shipping 
m 15.52 -- 0.00 0.00  0.00  7.98
Fine Arts (Art Auction Houses) 8.11 -- 0.24 0.00  82.24  7.00
Hydro-Electric power equipment, NO  -- -- 0.00 6.12  --  6.12
Telephone services, international, 
Korea  -- -- -- 5.52 --  5.52
Diamonds, Industrial   2.42 0.00 -- --  2.58  4.87
Vitamin D   0.00 0.00 4.87 0.00  0.00  4.61
Biotin (Vitamin H)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 162.53  4.36
Broadband Internet service, Korea  -- -- -- 3.98  --  3.9881 
Construction, SRO, Netherlands  -- -- 3.52 0.00  --  3.52
Vitamin B4 (Choline Chloride) 
Europe  0.00 6.89 3.46 0.00 0.00  3.47
Gasoline, FR  -- -- 0.00 3.45  --  3.45
Vitamin B2  24.43 16.39 1.01 0.00  100.00  3.44
Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, IT  -- -- 0.00 3.30  --  3.30
Cement, Romania  -- -- -- 3.28  --  3.28
Pharmaceuticals, cholesterol, IT  -- -- 0.00 3.25  --  3.25
Beta Carotene  21.21 23.20 0.55 0.00  101.30  3.10
Vitamin B5 (Calpan)  16.14 30.92 1.06 0.00  61.47  3.02
Vitamin C  16.88 16.33 0.30 0.02  69.35  2.86
Vitamin A  12.21 21.19 0.36 0.02  80.03  2.71
Vitamin E  13.87 13.37 0.25 0.01  73.63  2.68
Vitamin B12  0.00 99.61 0.00 0.00  6.98  2.57
Aluminum Phosphide, US  1.57 -- -- --  0.91  2.48
Lysine 44.16 44.44 0.85 0.00  43.11  2.42
Danish air routes  -- -- 2.34 0.00  --  2.34
Euro-Zone banks  -- -- 2.22 0.00  --  2.22
Compressed gas, CA  -- -- -- --  --  2.13
Ferrosilicon, US  2.07 -- -- --  0.00  2.07
Zinc phosphate  -- -- 1.79 0.00  --  1.79
Eurocheque -- -- 1.49 0.00  --  1.49
Generic drugs, warfarin & penicillin 
m, 
UK  -- -- 0.00 1.37 --  1.37
Choline chloride (Vitamin B4) 
f 0.56 2.06 0.41 0.00  15.62  1.10
Infant Formula (Episode 1), Italy  -- -- 0.00 1.10  --  1.10
Graphite Electrodes  16.53 5.37 0.16 0.01  21.22  1.05
Canthaxanthin 2.39 0.00 0.99 0.00 15.34  1.04
Linerboard, US  0.00 -- -- --  0.90  0.90
Stamp Auctions (Episode 1)  0.00 -- -- --  0.85  0.85
Carbon Fiber  0.00 -- -- --  0.83  0.83
Citric Acid  17.88 10.26 0.17 0.00  41.40  0.70
Steel tubes  ("oil country tubes") -- -- 0.32 0.00  --  0.30
Steel pipes, insulated heating  -- -- 0.27 0.00  --  0.27
Flat glass, U.S.  0.00 -- -- -- 0.25  0.25
Paper, carbonless  -- -- 0.24 0.00  --  0.24
TACA (Europe/No. Atlantic Shipping) -- -- 0.20 0.00  --  0.20
Compressed gases, NL  -- -- 0.08 0.00  --  0.08
Ferry services, English Channel   -- -- 0.02 0.00  --  0.02
British Sugar  -- -- 0.01 0.00  --  0.01
Cartonboard -- -- 0.01 0.00  --  0.01
Steel beams  -- -- 0.01 0.00  --  0.01
Steel, flat stainless -- -- 0.0031 0.00  --  0.0031
Polypropylene plastic  -- -- 0.0022 0.00  --  0.0022
PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) plastic  -- -- 0.00041 0.00  --  0.00041
Cable, high-voltage, Germany  -- -- 0.00 0.000007 --  0.00000
7
    
Median 14.98 17.58 0.31 7.15  38.32  4.61
Mean 23.35 24.3 1.47 51.62  53.74  36.8
Number (241 total)  30 20 31 31  37  92
          
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 






Table 21. Real Affected Sales by Industry Group and Location 
Industry  No.  US CA EU  Other  Total 
  Million real 2005 US dollars 
Agricultural raw materials, forestry*  6 29260.4 0.0 491.8 0.0  29752.2
Minerals 2 2733.9 173.0 2473.0 3021.9  8401.8
Construction 14 493.6 0.0 88417.7 22546.9  111458.3
        
Manufacturing: 204 423365.7 10087.6 406126.5 194330.1  1033909.8
Food and beverage  18 20541.2 0.0 11325.7 3691.4  35558.3
Tobacco 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6148.7  6148.7
Textiles 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Paper and printing  14 95225.8 4454.9 35929.9 24144.6  159755.2
Organic chemicals, food & ag. uses 36 23893.4 1804.4 24062.6 38202.9 87963.2
Organic chemicals, other  26 91759.6 834.5 21600.1 33638.5 147832.7
Inorganic chemicals, fertilizers  18 30444.6 1656.6 41568.5 21356.8 95026.4
Petroleum products  11 0.0 0.0 19615.4 2232.3  21847.7
Rubber and plastic  14 4608.1 65.1 26654.6 4771.3  36099.1
Stone, clay, graphite, glass products 23 102374.2 836.0 63816.4 35024.9 202051.5
Primary metals  1 35651.7 0.0 0.0 0.0  35651.7
Fabricated metal products  13 996.3 0.0 56273.3 9229.8  66499.4
Machinery 9 50.7 5.6 18379.4 4633.8  23069.5
Electronic devices  8 17820.2 430.6 84258.0 10981.2  113490.0
Instruments, misc. manufacturing 9 0.0 0.0 2642.7 273.9  2916.6
        
Services: 52 66311.1 3316.3 43260.7 92240.1  205128.2
Transport services  16 2181.9 107.6 11722.0 2956.9  16968.4
Communication services  10 0.0 0.0 1512.8 56195.8  57708.6
Wholesale, retail  11 0.0 0.0 14692.0 25775.3  40467.2
Finance, insurance, banking  6 60782.2 3171.3 14248.4 7312.2  85514.1
Other services  9 3346.9 37.4 1085.5 0.0  4469.9
        
Total, all industries  277 522239.2 13849.2 540534.4 311054.0  1387676.8
           
           
















Table 22. Real Affected Sales by Industry Group and Location 
Industry No.  US  CA  EU  Other  Total 
  Percent 
Agricultural raw materials, forestry* 2.2% 5.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 2.1% 
Minerals 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% 0.5% 1.0% 0.6% 
Construction 5.1% 0.1% 0.0% 16.4% 7.2%  8.0% 
     
Manufacturing: 73.6% 81.1% 72.8% 75.1% 62.5% 74.5% 
Food and beverage  6.5% 3.9% 0.0% 2.1% 1.2% 2.6% 
Tobacco 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.4% 
Textiles 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 
Paper and printing  5.1% 18.2% 32.2% 6.6% 7.8% 11.5% 
Organic chemicals, food & ag. uses 13.0% 4.6% 13.0% 4.5% 12.3% 6.3% 
Organic chemicals, other  9.4% 17.6% 6.0% 4.0% 10.8% 10.7% 
Inorganic chemicals, fertilizers 6.5% 5.8% 12.0% 7.7% 6.9%  6.8% 
Petroleum products  4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 0.7% 1.6% 
Rubber and plastic  5.1% 0.9% 0.5% 4.9% 1.5% 2.6% 
Stone, clay, graphite, glass products 8.3% 19.6% 6.0% 11.8% 11.3% 14.6% 
Primary metals  0.4% 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  2.6% 
Fabricated metal products  4.7% 0.2% 0.0% 10.4% 3.0% 4.8% 
Machinery 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 1.5%  1.7% 
Electronic devices  2.9% 3.4% 3.1% 15.6% 3.5% 8.2% 
Instruments, misc. manufacturing 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1%  0.2% 
     
Services: 18.8% 12.7% 23.9% 8.0% 29.7% 14.8% 
Transport services  5.8% 0.4% 0.8% 2.2% 1.0% 1.2% 
Communication services  3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 18.1% 4.2% 
Wholesale, retail  4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 8.3% 2.9% 
Finance, insurance, banking  2.2% 11.6% 22.9% 2.6% 2.4% 6.2% 
Other services  3.2% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 
         
Total, all industries  100 100 100 100 100  100 
        
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 
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Table 23. Average Duration of Cartels by Location, 1990-2005
Continent No.  mean  median  min  max 
     Years 
AF 2  6.0  6.0 3 9
AS 20  2.2  2.0 0 5
EE 5  2.0  1.0 1 4
GLOBAL 65  7.6  6.0 0 30
LA 5  7.8  4.0 1 24
NO 41  5.6  4.0 1 40
OC 4  6.3  5.0 4 11
WE: 90  6.5      4.0 0 95
   EU  36  7.2  5.5 0 44
   Other WE  54  6.1  3.5 0 95
    
Total 232  6.4  5.0 1 95
Source: Private Intl. Cartels Spreadsheet dated October 2006 
Note: Duration is understated because full years were recorded and most 
 cartels were launched in January.   
 